CAJ | 학술논문

上市公司的信息披露可以看做一个涉及多个当事人的复杂博弈。本文通过博弈论的动态博弈方法分析了上市公司信息披露的过程，并提供了四阶段的动态博弈模型：一阶段分析表明上市公司管理者在无外部约束的情况下必然会选择“夸大”型信息披露方式；二阶段分析表明尽管审计公司可以拒绝上市公司虚假的信息披露，但这种威胁是不可信的；三阶段分析模型在监管者加入后对上市公司的威胁成为可信的，上市公司会进行诚实的信息披露；四阶段分析表明寻租的存在会使上市公司能够继续从事“夸大”型信息披露方式，并造成了社会资源的浪费。最后本文加入了不确定性的讨论并提出相关的建议。
상시공사적신식피로가이간주일개섭급다개당사인적복잡박혁。본문통과박혁론적동태박혁방법분석료상시공사신식피로적과정，병제공료사계단적동태박혁모형：일계단분석표명상시공사관리자재무외부약속적정황하필연회선택“과대”형신식피로방식；이계단분석표명진관심계공사가이거절상시공사허가적신식피로，단저충위협시불가신적；삼계단분석모형재감관자가입후대상시공사적위협성위가신적，상시공사회진행성실적신식피로；사계단분석표명심조적존재회사상시공사능구계속종사“과대”형신식피로방식，병조성료사회자원적낭비。최후본문가입료불학정성적토론병제출상관적건의。
The listed company＇s information disclosure can be taken as a complicated game about multiple par- ties. Based on the game theory, this paper studies the process of the listed company＇ s information disclosure, and pro- poses four stages dynamic game theory tree. In the one stage tree, we know that the listed company managers will choose the ＂exaggerated＂ information disclose without the external constraint. And from the two stages tree, we show that although the auditing firm can reject the exaggerated information disclose, but the threat is not credible. In the three stages tree, we join the regulator in the model, and we get the result that the listed company will choose the ＂hon- est＂ information disclose by the superise from the regulator. At the four stages game tree, we learn that the rent-seeking will make the listed company keeping the ＂exaggerated＂ information disclose and cause the waste of social resources. At last, we join the uncertainty in the game and get some important results, and we propose some suggestions based on the paper＇ s analysis.