CAJ | 학술논문

由于期货交易所没有内在化不完全监管的成本，使交易所监管激励不足。会员制交易所的组织结构、决策机制、会员之间的利益冲突，也会降低交易所市场监管激励。对美国期货市场政府介入之前的交易所自律监管的考察，也印证了交易所没有足够激励去选择符合全社会要求的监管水平，并且会频繁出现市场操纵等滥用行为。政府有必要以监管的方式介入期货市场，保证市场安全、稳定。政府介入期货市场的方式应主要采取借助于交易所等自律组织的混合监管模式。
유우기화교역소몰유내재화불완전감관적성본，사교역소감관격려불족。회원제교역소적조직결구、결책궤제、회원지간적이익충돌，야회강저교역소시장감관격려。대미국기화시장정부개입지전적교역소자률감관적고찰，야인증료교역소몰유족구격려거선택부합전사회요구적감관수평，병차회빈번출현시장조종등람용행위。정부유필요이감관적방식개입기화시장，보증시장안전、은정。정부개입기화시장적방식응주요채취차조우교역소등자률조직적혼합감관모식。
As futures exchanges do not bear the total costs of re gulation incompleteness, they often lack incentives to strengthen regulation. The membership structure, decision-making mechanisms and interest conflicts among members further reduce the regulative incentives of futures exchanges. A brief review of the history of futures exchanges in the US proves the above argument. It is necessary for the government to intervene in futures market regulation to ensure market safety and stability. But for the performance of government intervene, the regulatory mode or allocation of regulatory rights is very important.