绿色科技
綠色科技
록색과기
LVSE DASHIJIU
2012年
8期
191-195
,共5页
逆向供应链%演化博弈%风险偏好%补贴机制%绿色经济
逆嚮供應鏈%縯化博弈%風險偏好%補貼機製%綠色經濟
역향공응련%연화박혁%풍험편호%보첩궤제%록색경제
reverse supply chain%evolutionary game%risk preference%subsidy mechanism%green economy
运用演化博弈的基本原理分析了在政府补贴机制下逆向供应链中制造商与回收商合作行为的演化过程。研究得到制造商与回收商达成合作的两个充要条件分别是：博弈双方选择＂合作＂可获的收益大于其＂不合作＂时所获的收益;政府给予的补贴额度不小于制造商的合作成本。随后通过数值模拟对相关结论进行了验证,并探讨了补贴额度对制造商和回收商的合作行为的影响。就政府如何加强逆向供应链中制造商与回收商之间的合作关系提出了相应的政策建议。
運用縯化博弈的基本原理分析瞭在政府補貼機製下逆嚮供應鏈中製造商與迴收商閤作行為的縯化過程。研究得到製造商與迴收商達成閤作的兩箇充要條件分彆是：博弈雙方選擇＂閤作＂可穫的收益大于其＂不閤作＂時所穫的收益;政府給予的補貼額度不小于製造商的閤作成本。隨後通過數值模擬對相關結論進行瞭驗證,併探討瞭補貼額度對製造商和迴收商的閤作行為的影響。就政府如何加彊逆嚮供應鏈中製造商與迴收商之間的閤作關繫提齣瞭相應的政策建議。
운용연화박혁적기본원리분석료재정부보첩궤제하역향공응련중제조상여회수상합작행위적연화과정。연구득도제조상여회수상체성합작적량개충요조건분별시：박혁쌍방선택＂합작＂가획적수익대우기＂불합작＂시소획적수익;정부급여적보첩액도불소우제조상적합작성본。수후통과수치모의대상관결론진행료험증,병탐토료보첩액도대제조상화회수상적합작행위적영향。취정부여하가강역향공응련중제조상여회수상지간적합작관계제출료상응적정책건의。
This paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyse the evolutionary process of manufacturers and collectors in the reverse supply chain based in the government subsidy mechanism.Two necessary and sufficient conditions for the game members＇ cooperation are obtained.The one is that cooperation of the two sides of the game can bring more profits than noncooperation.The other one is that the subsidies given by government are not less than the cooperation costs of the manufacturers.And then the paper verifies the above-mentioned conditions by numerical simulation,and analyses the effects of amount of subsidies on the cooperative behavior of manufacturers and recyclers.Finally,the paper provides some policy recommendations on how the government to strengthen the cooperative relations between manufacturers and collectors in the reverse supply chain.
