CAJ | 학술논문

通过建立完全信息无限次重复博弈民间借贷模型，基于村庄治理理论，研究了传统农村民间借贷稳定运行的内在原因，认为正是村庄治理的两大作用：信息形成和违约惩罚，抑制了传统农村民间借贷风险，维持并促进民间借贷的稳定发展。因此，认为基于血缘、地缘关系的传统农村民间借贷是一种非常稳定的借贷形式。
통과건립완전신식무한차중복박혁민간차대모형，기우촌장치리이론，연구료전통농촌민간차대은정운행적내재원인，인위정시촌장치리적량대작용：신식형성화위약징벌，억제료전통농촌민간차대풍험，유지병촉진민간차대적은정발전。인차，인위기우혈연、지연관계적전통농촌민간차대시일충비상은정적차대형식。
Based on the village governance theory and a model of private lending established on infinitely repeated games under complete information environment, this article makes a study of the internal causes of the stable operation of traditional private lending in rural areas. It holds that it is the two functions of village governance, information formation and default punishment, that inhibit the risk, maintain and promote the stable development of the private lending. It argues that the traditional rural private lending based on kinship and geographical relation is very stable.