CAJ | 학술논문

在经典价格竞争模型-伯川德模型的基础上,采用演化博弈理论和方法研究不完全信息条件下企业价格竞争的发生机理。结果表明：产品消费者价格敏感度、企业降价幅度及降价企业的类型都约束着激烈价格竞争的发生;较多企业在不进行价格合谋的条件下,可以自发演化为价格不变,从而从不完全信息的角度解决了伯川德悖论,揭示了企业价格竞争的内在机理。
재경전개격경쟁모형-백천덕모형적기출상,채용연화박혁이론화방법연구불완전신식조건하기업개격경쟁적발생궤리。결과표명：산품소비자개격민감도、기업강개폭도급강개기업적류형도약속착격렬개격경쟁적발생;교다기업재불진행개격합모적조건하,가이자발연화위개격불변,종이종불완전신식적각도해결료백천덕패론,게시료기업개격경쟁적내재궤리。
From the perspective and method of the evolutionary game theory, the occurrence mechanism of price competition of enterprises under the environment of incomplete information is discussed. Results show that the sensitivity degree of consumers to the price of product, the de- creasing extent of price, and the type of enterprise which decreases price, restrain the occurrence of intense price competition. Under the situation where price collusion is absent, a large quantity of enterprises can spontaneously evolve to the state that the price is invariable. So, the Bertrand paradox is resolved from the perspective of incomplete information, and the inherent mechanisms of price competition of enterprises are discovered.