CAJ | 학술논문

地方政府行为依赖于所面临的激励与约束机制。地方政府竞争成为我国经济增长进程中的常态，这源于我国独特的政府分权制度。在财政激励下，地方政府通过对各要素采取非均衡的产权保护方式为增长而竞争。这种竞争模式过度保护了资本要素，而忽视甚至侵害了劳动力、土地等要素。因此，地方政府竞争在促进我国经济高增长的同时，也付出了极高的代价。在缺乏公众等主体的约束下。政府分权带来激励偏差会加大，该发展模式将受到很大的挑战。
지방정부행위의뢰우소면림적격려여약속궤제。지방정부경쟁성위아국경제증장진정중적상태，저원우아국독특적정부분권제도。재재정격려하，지방정부통과대각요소채취비균형적산권보호방식위증장이경쟁。저충경쟁모식과도보호료자본요소，이홀시심지침해료노동력、토지등요소。인차，지방정부경쟁재촉진아국경제고증장적동시，야부출료겁고적대개。재결핍공음등주체적약속하。정부분권대래격려편차회가대，해발전모식장수도흔대적도전。
The behavior of local governments depends on the mechanisms of incentive and restraint. Competition between local governments becomes the norm in the process of China' s economic growth, which stems from our unique system of governmental decentralization. Facing the financial in- eentivea, the local government competes for growth through non - balaneod property fights protection of the various elements. This mode of competi- tion makes the local government protect capital too much, while ignoring or even destroying the labor, land and other factors. Thus, competition between local governments promotes China' s economic growth, meanwhile pays a high price. In the absence of the public and other constraints, the incentive bias will increase brought by governmental decentralization, , and this mode of development will face a great challenge.