CAJ | 학술논문

以我国上市公司为研究对象。考察不同政府控制下，高管薪酬激励制度对上市公司盈余管理的影响，实证结果表明，在国有企业中，高管薪酬与盈余管理正向相关，说明高管薪酬激励在一定程度上并不能积极参与上市公司治理，反而构成了盈余管理的动因之一；在民营企业中，高管薪酬与盈余管理正相关并不显著，说明民营企业中高管薪酬激励在一定程度发挥了治理功能并不构成盈余管理的动因。研究结果有助于揭示高管薪酬激励制度作为公司治理的外部机制所带来的经济后果。
이아국상시공사위연구대상。고찰불동정부공제하，고관신수격려제도대상시공사영여관리적영향，실증결과표명，재국유기업중，고관신수여영여관리정향상관，설명고관신수격려재일정정도상병불능적겁삼여상시공사치리，반이구성료영여관리적동인지일；재민영기업중，고관신수여영여관리정상관병불현저，설명민영기업중고관신수격려재일정정도발휘료치리공능병불구성영여관리적동인。연구결과유조우게시고관신수격려제도작위공사치리적외부궤제소대래적경제후과。
In this paper, to investigation the association between executive pay and earnings management under the control of different government. The empirical results show that executive pay are positive associated with earnings management in the state - owned enterprises,but executive pay is not significantly related to earnings management in private enterprises. Result contributes to disclose the economic effects of the executive pay as outside mechanism of corporate govemanee.