CAJ | 학술논문

随着联系密切而竞争激烈的全球化市场不断发展，企业意图通过联盟合作来应对挑战。但是由于信息不对称的存在，如何寻找潜在优秀的或者有特质的合作伙伴成为一大难题。基于信号传递理论，官员视察可以作为有效的质量信号和政企关系信号传递，帮助企业解决信息不对称的同时，推动企业联盟的市场行为。以2004-2007年制造业上市公司为样本，实证分析官员视察对企业联盟的影响。结果表明，官员视察活动对企业联盟有显著的积极影响；官员视察对在制度环境越差地区的企业联盟影响更大；但官员视察对企业联盟的影响在国企、民企之间没有显著差异。
수착련계밀절이경쟁격렬적전구화시장불단발전，기업의도통과련맹합작래응대도전。단시유우신식불대칭적존재，여하심조잠재우수적혹자유특질적합작화반성위일대난제。기우신호전체이론，관원시찰가이작위유효적질량신호화정기관계신호전체，방조기업해결신식불대칭적동시，추동기업련맹적시장행위。이2004-2007년제조업상시공사위양본，실증분석관원시찰대기업련맹적영향。결과표명，관원시찰활동대기업련맹유현저적적겁영향；관원시찰대재제도배경월차지구적기업련맹영향경대；단관원시찰대기업련맹적영향재국기、민기지간몰유현저차이。
With the development of the closely-connected and highly competitive global market,enterprises tend to engage in alliance in order to survive and grow rapidly. However,it is difficult for enterprises to find out the potentially excellent partners because of information asymmetry. Based on the signaling theory, our study finds that the government officials'inspections is an effective signal of enterprise quality and government-enterprise relationship,which helps mitigate the information asymmetry and promote the alliance among enterprises.Using a sample of listed manufacturing enterprises in China from 2004 to 2007 ,this study investigates the effects of officials' inspections on enterprise alliance.It is shown that officials' inspections have a significantly positive effect on enterprise alliance.The effect is more pronounced in the regions where the institutional environment is worse.However,there is no significant difference in the effect between the state-owned enterprises (SOEs)and the non state-owned enterprises.