CAJ | 학술논문

以我国经理人市场的选拔机制为切入点，结合总经理的继任来源，考察企业高管层内的薪酬差距对企业绩效的影响。结果表明，在国有企业中，总经理的继任来源与高管层内的薪酬差距变动无显著关系；在非国有企业中，总经理的内部继任与高管层内的薪酬差距变动负相关。进一步分析发现，在国有企业中，总经理的继任来源不会影响高管薪酬差距的激励作用；在非国有企业中，当总经理从内部继任时，高管薪酬差距产生更好的激励作用，当总经理从外部继任时，增加的薪酬差距无法有效激励高管。
이아국경리인시장적선발궤제위절입점，결합총경리적계임래원，고찰기업고관층내적신수차거대기업적효적영향。결과표명，재국유기업중，총경리적계임래원여고관층내적신수차거변동무현저관계；재비국유기업중，총경리적내부계임여고관층내적신수차거변동부상관。진일보분석발현，재국유기업중，총경리적계임래원불회영향고관신수차거적격려작용；재비국유기업중，당총경리종내부계임시，고관신수차거산생경호적격려작용，당총경리종외부계임시，증가적신수차거무법유효격려고관。
From the perspectives of the selection mechanism in the Chinese labor market for managers and the CEO succession resource,the paper studies the effects of top management compensation gap on corporate performance.The results show that,in the state-owned companies,CEO succession resource has no significant association with the top management compensation gap,while in non-state-owned enterprises,the top management compensation gap is negatively associated with the internal CEO promotion.The further analysis reveals that in the state-owned enterprises,CEO succession resource has no significant impact on the incentive effect of top management compensation gap.However, in non-state-owned enterprises,the incentive effect of top management compensation gap is significant when the CEO succession resource is internal promotion rather than external recruitment.