CAJ | 학술논문

基于排污权交易制度,运用Hotelling模型,在双寡头垄断专业污水处理市场中引入竞优机制,分析专业污水处理企业的投资动机。结果表明：在条状城市中,两企业的建厂选址策略受双方边际成本及单位污水运输费的影响;两寡头垄断企业竞优的结果存在两种情形,一种是两企业分别选择在城市两端建厂的策略,一种是边际成本较小的企业在选址上具有主动权、有多种选择策略;双方关于边际成本的竞优博弈具有直接效应和策略效应。
기우배오권교역제도,운용Hotelling모형,재쌍과두롱단전업오수처리시장중인입경우궤제,분석전업오수처리기업적투자동궤。결과표명：재조상성시중,량기업적건엄선지책략수쌍방변제성본급단위오수운수비적영향;량과두롱단기업경우적결과존재량충정형,일충시량기업분별선택재성시량단건엄적책략,일충시변제성본교소적기업재선지상구유주동권、유다충선택책략;쌍방관우변제성본적경우박혁구유직접효응화책략효응。
Based on the emission trading system and the Hotetling model, this paper introduces the Jingyou mechanism into the oligopoly profes- sional sewage disposal market, and analyzes the investment behavior of professional sewage disposal enterprise. The result shows as follows：in a strip city, the strategy on factory construction location of two enterprises are impacted by marginal costs of both sleds and unit sewage transpor- tation cost;Jingyou between two oligopoly enterprises will lead to two cases,one case is two enterprise build their ~actor~es at the both ends of city respectively, another case is one with smaller marginal cost has more initiative and Jingyou strategy;the Jingyou game between two sides for marginal cost has direct effect and strategic effect.