CAJ | 학술논문

文章讨论了当存在碳税和管理激励的条件下，企业拥有低碳技术时技术转让方式的最优选择问题。运用基于博弈论的数量竞争模型和讨价还价模型，假定双寡头市场中某企业拥有低碳技术，具体研究了存在管理激励条件下的固定费用和比例抽成两种技术许可方式。结果表明：显著创新情形下，创新企业不会将技术许可给其他企业使用。非显著创新情形下，当创新在特定幅度以内时，创新企业愿意进行技术许可；但当创新超过特定幅度时，只有在比例抽成方式下，企业才愿意进行技术许可。对创新企业而言，比例抽成的技术许可方式优于固定费用许可方式，管理激励的存在与否会影响创新企业在进行比例抽成许可方式时的最大抽成比例，而不同的技术许可方式也会对企业内部的均衡管理激励程度产生影响。
문장토론료당존재탄세화관리격려적조건하，기업옹유저탄기술시기술전양방식적최우선택문제。운용기우박혁론적수량경쟁모형화토개환개모형，가정쌍과두시장중모기업옹유저탄기술，구체연구료존재관리격려조건하적고정비용화비례추성량충기술허가방식。결과표명：현저창신정형하，창신기업불회장기술허가급기타기업사용。비현저창신정형하，당창신재특정폭도이내시，창신기업원의진행기술허가；단당창신초과특정폭도시，지유재비례추성방식하，기업재원의진행기술허가。대창신기업이언，비례추성적기술허가방식우우고정비용허가방식，관리격려적존재여부회영향창신기업재진행비례추성허가방식시적최대추성비례，이불동적기술허가방식야회대기업내부적균형관리격려정도산생영향。
With the carbon tax and managerial incentive being imposed , the optimal selection problem of transfer of low carbon technology is discussed .It assumes that , in a duopoly market under managerial in-centive with regard to the carbon tax , one of the firms has a low-carbon technology .Based on Cournot competition model and bargaining model , fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing are studied by using game theory .It shows that , if the innovation is drastic , the firm does not want to license its low carbon technology .If the innovation is non-drastic , whether the firm is willing to license its technology or not de-pends on how drastic the innovation is .Royalty licensing is always better than fixed-fee licensing for the innovative firm.There is a managerial incentive that affects the amount of the royalty .Further, different technology licensing influences the firm's equilibrium managerial incentive .