CAJ | 학술논문

研究了政府在医疗保险基金代管过程中对商业保险公司的激励机制。基于仿真计算讨论委托人产出函数为非线性时委托代理模型中的激励措施。结果表明，当外部风险低于阈值时，委托人应采用浮动收益法进行激励；当外部风险高于阈值时，委托人应采用固定收益和浮动收益相结合的方式进行激励。代理人的努力程度与其内部成本系数成反比；代理人所能忍受的外部风险阈值与其风险规避度成负相关关系。因此，委托人应当选择管理经验丰富、人员流动性低、资产规模大和财务状况稳健的商业保险公司进行基金代理，以保证在相同的激励成本条件下能够获得最大产出收益。
연구료정부재의료보험기금대관과정중대상업보험공사적격려궤제。기우방진계산토론위탁인산출함수위비선성시위탁대리모형중적격려조시。결과표명，당외부풍험저우역치시，위탁인응채용부동수익법진행격려；당외부풍험고우역치시，위탁인응채용고정수익화부동수익상결합적방식진행격려。대리인적노력정도여기내부성본계수성반비；대리인소능인수적외부풍험역치여기풍험규피도성부상관관계。인차，위탁인응당선택관리경험봉부、인원류동성저、자산규모대화재무상황은건적상업보험공사진행기금대리，이보증재상동적격려성본조건하능구획득최대산출수익。
The incentive mechanism of an insurance company running a social medical insurance fund is discussed.By using the simulation method,incentives in a principal-agent model with a non-linear principal production function are presented.Results show that variable compensation is pre-ferred when the risk is below the threshold;otherwise,combining fixed compensation with variable compensation is recommended.The relationship between the agents effort and the intrinsic cost co-efficient is inverse.The external risk threshold agent endured is negative correlation to the risk aver-sion.Therefore,the principal should choose the insurance company which has rich management expe-rience,low staff mobility,large assets and a stable financial situation to obtain the maximum benefits.