预测
預測
예측
FORECASTING
2014年
5期
71-75,80
,共6页
黄健柏%王叶%钟美瑞%程慧
黃健柏%王葉%鐘美瑞%程慧
황건백%왕협%종미서%정혜
矿产资源%开发补偿%代际公平%组合性均衡评价
礦產資源%開髮補償%代際公平%組閤性均衡評價
광산자원%개발보상%대제공평%조합성균형평개
mineral resources%exploitation compensation%intergenerational equity%combinational equilibrium evaluation
针对矿产资源的耗竭性与不可再生性及在开发过程中的外部性,本文构建了一种可以评价其生产价值、产权价值、生态价值及代际补偿价值的组合性均衡评价模型。即用期权价值修正矿产资源开发补偿的基准值,修正内容包括矿产资源开发的不确定性及博弈主体的策略性价值,并用利他心理效用函数修正矿产开发中博弈主体的效用,体现矿产资源开发的代际补偿价值。以此为基础,构建基于贝叶斯规则及动态博弈均衡的矿产资源协议定价博弈模型,分析基准值及效用函数的修正如何影响博弈主体的策略选择及定价均衡。模型结果表明将期权价值和利他效用纳入组合性均衡评价模型后,增加了公司违规开采和所有者低价出售矿产资源的成本,资源代际配置倾向合理,从而实现矿产资源的可持续利用和社会福利的帕累托改进。
針對礦產資源的耗竭性與不可再生性及在開髮過程中的外部性,本文構建瞭一種可以評價其生產價值、產權價值、生態價值及代際補償價值的組閤性均衡評價模型。即用期權價值脩正礦產資源開髮補償的基準值,脩正內容包括礦產資源開髮的不確定性及博弈主體的策略性價值,併用利他心理效用函數脩正礦產開髮中博弈主體的效用,體現礦產資源開髮的代際補償價值。以此為基礎,構建基于貝葉斯規則及動態博弈均衡的礦產資源協議定價博弈模型,分析基準值及效用函數的脩正如何影響博弈主體的策略選擇及定價均衡。模型結果錶明將期權價值和利他效用納入組閤性均衡評價模型後,增加瞭公司違規開採和所有者低價齣售礦產資源的成本,資源代際配置傾嚮閤理,從而實現礦產資源的可持續利用和社會福利的帕纍託改進。
침대광산자원적모갈성여불가재생성급재개발과정중적외부성,본문구건료일충가이평개기생산개치、산권개치、생태개치급대제보상개치적조합성균형평개모형。즉용기권개치수정광산자원개발보상적기준치,수정내용포괄광산자원개발적불학정성급박혁주체적책략성개치,병용이타심리효용함수수정광산개발중박혁주체적효용,체현광산자원개발적대제보상개치。이차위기출,구건기우패협사규칙급동태박혁균형적광산자원협의정개박혁모형,분석기준치급효용함수적수정여하영향박혁주체적책략선택급정개균형。모형결과표명장기권개치화이타효용납입조합성균형평개모형후,증가료공사위규개채화소유자저개출수광산자원적성본,자원대제배치경향합리,종이실현광산자원적가지속이용화사회복리적파루탁개진。
Aiming at the exhaustion and the non-renewability of mineral resources as well as the externality problems in the process of exploitation, the paper builds a combinational equilibrium evaluation model which can evaluate production value, property value, ecological value and intergenerational compensation value. That is, using option value to modify the reference value of compensation of mineral resources exploitation, the modifications including the uncertainty of mineralresources exploitation and the strategic value of the game’ s players and using altruistic utility function to modify the utility of the game’ s players in the exploitation of mineral resources, to reflect intergenerational compensation value of mineral resources. Based on these, the paper builds the agreement pricing game model of mineral resources based on the Bayes rules and dynamic game equilibrium and analyses how the modification of the reference value and utility func-tion affect the strategic selection of the game’ s players and the pricing equilibrium. The results show that getting option value and altruistic utility involved in combinational equilibrium evaluation model increases the cost of the company’ s illegal mining and the owner’ s selling of mineral resources at a low price. What’ s more, the intergenerational allocation of mineral resources tends to be reasonable. Thus the sustainable use of mineral resources and the Pareto improvement of social welfare can be achieved.