CAJ | 학술논문

项目选择和收益分配的道德风险行为影响着投资者和企业家之间契约的签订和执行效率，不同的签约机制对企业家道德风险行为产生了不同的规制作用，进而影响了公司金融契约当事人的行为。本文采用比较制度实验的研究方法，分析了随机分组、双向拍卖和单方报价三种签约机制下的公司金融契约治理效率，对比研究了三种签约机制下的市场绩效和收益分布。结果表明：公司金融契约治理效率随时间逐渐降低，且三种签约机制产生的影响存在差异，双向拍卖机制下的治理效率下降最慢，单方报价机制下的治理效率下降最快；双向拍卖机制下市场绩效最高，单方报价下最低，企业家占有的交易剩余高于投资者。这一结论为公司金融契约当事人的激励相容提供了行为基础。
항목선택화수익분배적도덕풍험행위영향착투자자화기업가지간계약적첨정화집행효솔，불동적첨약궤제대기업가도덕풍험행위산생료불동적규제작용，진이영향료공사금융계약당사인적행위。본문채용비교제도실험적연구방법，분석료수궤분조、쌍향박매화단방보개삼충첨약궤제하적공사금융계약치리효솔，대비연구료삼충첨약궤제하적시장적효화수익분포。결과표명：공사금융계약치리효솔수시간축점강저，차삼충첨약궤제산생적영향존재차이，쌍향박매궤제하적치리효솔하강최만，단방보개궤제하적치리효솔하강최쾌；쌍향박매궤제하시장적효최고，단방보개하최저，기업가점유적교역잉여고우투자자。저일결론위공사금융계약당사인적격려상용제공료행위기출。
The signing and execution efficiency of corporate financial contract is affected by the moral hazard behaviors of project selection and income distribution of entrepreneurs. Different contract mechanisms have different regulation func-tion on the moral hazard behaviors of entrepreneurs and thereby affect the behavior of corporate financial contract core stakeholders. We analyze the different governance efficiency of corporate financial contract, the market performance, the return distributions in three kinds of contract mechanism which are randomization mechanism, double auction mechanism and unilateral offer mechanism by the method of comparative institutional experiment. The results show that the govern-ance efficiency of corporate financial contract decreased with time and the impact of the three kinds of contract mecha-nism are different that the governance efficiency decreased slowestly with the double auction mechanism and fastestly with the unilateral offer mechanism;the market performance is highest with the double auction mechanism and lowest with the unilateral offer mechanism; entrepreneurs hold more trading surplus than investors. These results supply a behavioral foundation for the incentive compatibility of corporate financial contract core stakeholders.