合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版)
閤肥工業大學學報(自然科學版)
합비공업대학학보(자연과학판)
JOURNAL OF HEFEI UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY(NATURAL SCIENCE)
2014年
9期
1138-1142
,共5页
链合创新%合作研发%供应链融资%博弈论
鏈閤創新%閤作研髮%供應鏈融資%博弈論
련합창신%합작연발%공응련융자%박혁론
vertical cooperative innovation%cooperative R&D%supply chain financing%game theory
文章从利用供应链融资模式为技术创新投入进行融资的角度出发,构建了无技术溢出下的链合创新博弈模型,采用逆向归纳法,针对存在1个上游供应商和1个下游制造商的2层产业结构,分析比较了上、下游企业在非合作创新和合作创新形式下双方的策略选择和期望利润函数。结果表明:合作创新相对于非合作创新有着更高的期望利润、期望产出,存在帕累托改进;合作博弈与动态博弈下的创新度均高于静态博弈时的创新度,在创新成功率大于50%的情况下,合作创新时的创新度高于动态博弈时的创新度。
文章從利用供應鏈融資模式為技術創新投入進行融資的角度齣髮,構建瞭無技術溢齣下的鏈閤創新博弈模型,採用逆嚮歸納法,針對存在1箇上遊供應商和1箇下遊製造商的2層產業結構,分析比較瞭上、下遊企業在非閤作創新和閤作創新形式下雙方的策略選擇和期望利潤函數。結果錶明:閤作創新相對于非閤作創新有著更高的期望利潤、期望產齣,存在帕纍託改進;閤作博弈與動態博弈下的創新度均高于靜態博弈時的創新度,在創新成功率大于50%的情況下,閤作創新時的創新度高于動態博弈時的創新度。
문장종이용공응련융자모식위기술창신투입진행융자적각도출발,구건료무기술일출하적련합창신박혁모형,채용역향귀납법,침대존재1개상유공응상화1개하유제조상적2층산업결구,분석비교료상、하유기업재비합작창신화합작창신형식하쌍방적책략선택화기망리윤함수。결과표명:합작창신상대우비합작창신유착경고적기망리윤、기망산출,존재파루탁개진;합작박혁여동태박혁하적창신도균고우정태박혁시적창신도,재창신성공솔대우50%적정황하,합작창신시적창신도고우동태박혁시적창신도。
In this paper ,a vertical cooperative innovation game model under nontechnical spillover con-dition is constructed .In view of supply chain financing for technology innovation ,with the help of backward induction ,a double check industrial structure including an upstream supplier and a down-stream manufacturer is studied ,and the strategy selections and expected profit functions under coop-erative innovation and non-cooperative innovation conditions between the upstream and the down-stream are compared .The results show that compared with the non-cooperative innovation ,the coop-erative innovation possesses higher expected profit of industry chain ,optimal output and Pareto im-provement .T he innovation degree of cooperative game and dynamic game is both higher than that of static game .When the innovation success rate is higher than 50% ,the innovation degree of coopera-tive innovation is higher than that of dynamic game .