西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版)
西安電子科技大學學報(社會科學版)
서안전자과기대학학보(사회과학판)
JORUNAL OF XIDIAN UNIVERSITY(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION)
2014年
3期
22-26
,共5页
委托-代理理论%项目经理%违约金%收益率
委託-代理理論%項目經理%違約金%收益率
위탁-대리이론%항목경리%위약금%수익솔
The principal-agent theory%project manager%penalty%rate of return
为获得更多收益施工企业的单方违约行为严重损害了项目经理应得权益,准确确定双方签订合同中违约金数额是解决这一问题的关键。基于委托-代理理论,通过增加违约边界约束,构建违约金分析模型,结论得出违约金的数额与项目经理的机会成本、努力成本以及风险成本成正比,与施工企业期望收益率成反比,最终确定违约金数额有效范围,并通过算例进行检验。违约金分析模型的建立,在保障施工企业收益的同时,为项目经理在签订合约中违约金一项提供理论依据。
為穫得更多收益施工企業的單方違約行為嚴重損害瞭項目經理應得權益,準確確定雙方籤訂閤同中違約金數額是解決這一問題的關鍵。基于委託-代理理論,通過增加違約邊界約束,構建違約金分析模型,結論得齣違約金的數額與項目經理的機會成本、努力成本以及風險成本成正比,與施工企業期望收益率成反比,最終確定違約金數額有效範圍,併通過算例進行檢驗。違約金分析模型的建立,在保障施工企業收益的同時,為項目經理在籤訂閤約中違約金一項提供理論依據。
위획득경다수익시공기업적단방위약행위엄중손해료항목경리응득권익,준학학정쌍방첨정합동중위약금수액시해결저일문제적관건。기우위탁-대리이론,통과증가위약변계약속,구건위약금분석모형,결론득출위약금적수액여항목경리적궤회성본、노력성본이급풍험성본성정비,여시공기업기망수익솔성반비,최종학정위약금수액유효범위,병통과산례진행검험。위약금분석모형적건립,재보장시공기업수익적동시,위항목경리재첨정합약중위약금일항제공이론의거。
In order to obtain more profits, the contract unilateral breach of the construction enterprises gives serious damage to the entitlement of the project manager, confirming the amount of liquidated damages in the contract signed by the two sides accurately is the key to solve this problem. The penalty analysis model is built in this paper with the principal-agent theory by increasing the default boundary constraints. The result shows:the amount of damages is proportional to the project manager's opportunity costs, sale costs and risk costs, and is inversely proportional to the expected return rate of the enterprises, and ultimately determines the effective range of the amount of penalty. Through the example, the model calculation is tested. The building of the penalty analysis model provides the basis for the project manager to consider the penalty item in the contract based on guaranteeing the construction enterprises maximize profits.