CAJ | 학술논문

旅游服务供应链中，旅行社与导游之间的信息非对称而导致的逆向选择和道德风险问题将损害旅行社的利益，因此，如何对导游进行有效甄别与激励是旅行社所要关注的一个重要问题。以导游的服务能力和努力水平两种私有信息不被旅行社所观察到，但其服务业绩可以被观测到为基础，利用博弈论与信息经济学等理论和方法设计了导游的服务能力为连续类型下的激励机制，运用最优化原理得出了最优激励机制参数。结果表明，旅行社应对不同服务能力的导游设计一揽子形式的不同的激励机制。双重非对称信息下的激励机制不仅能对导游起到自我选择的甄别作用，还能起到诱导导游提高工作努力水平的激励作用。
여유복무공응련중，여행사여도유지간적신식비대칭이도치적역향선택화도덕풍험문제장손해여행사적이익，인차，여하대도유진행유효견별여격려시여행사소요관주적일개중요문제。이도유적복무능력화노력수평량충사유신식불피여행사소관찰도，단기복무업적가이피관측도위기출，이용박혁론여신식경제학등이론화방법설계료도유적복무능력위련속류형하적격려궤제，운용최우화원리득출료최우격려궤제삼수。결과표명，여행사응대불동복무능력적도유설계일람자형식적불동적격려궤제。쌍중비대칭신식하적격려궤제불부능대도유기도자아선택적견별작용，환능기도유도도유제고공작노력수평적격려작용。
The adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry between the travel agency and the tour guides in the tourism service supply do make damage to the travel agency ’s interests, so an impor-tant question is how the travel agency can screen the true ability of the tour guides and provide incentive mecha -nism to make them work more effectively.The tour guides’ two kinds of private information, which are the serv-ice ability and the effort level cannot be observed , but their service performance can be measured by the travel agency.This paper designs the incentive mechanism by using game theory , information economics theory, etc., under the condition that the tour guides ’ service ability is continuous, and obtains the parameters of the optimal incentive mechanism by using optimization theory .The results show that the travel agency shall design different incentive mechanisms for the tour guides who possess different service ability .The incentive mechanism under dual asymmetric information not only has the function of self-selection screening for the tour guides, but also can induce them to enhance their effort level .