CAJ | 학술논문

本文在独立私人价值模型的基础上，通过引入投标成本，建立了考虑交易费用的一级价格密封招标博弈模型，给出了对称的进入点均衡和相应的对称均衡报价策略。研究表明，交易费用的出现排除了高成本类型的投标者，但也导致了竞标人数的不确定性，招标方为了降低招标无效率的可能性，必须限制潜在投标者人数；另一方面，在招投标过程中降低交易费用对交易双方来说都是有利的，招标方给予投标者投标补偿以激励其参与竞标的机制是可行的。
본문재독립사인개치모형적기출상，통과인입투표성본，건립료고필교역비용적일급개격밀봉초표박혁모형，급출료대칭적진입점균형화상응적대칭균형보개책략。연구표명，교역비용적출현배제료고성본류형적투표자，단야도치료경표인수적불학정성，초표방위료강저초표무효솔적가능성，필수한제잠재투표자인수；령일방면，재초투표과정중강저교역비용대교역쌍방래설도시유리적，초표방급여투표자투표보상이격려기삼여경표적궤제시가행적。
In the symmetry independent private value model with bidding cost , the paper builds a first-price sealed bidding game model and provides the symmetric cut-off strategy&bidding equilibrium.The research indi-cates that transaction costs exclude bidders of high cost type , but cause the uncertainty of bidders ’ participation. To decrease the possibility of inefficient bidding , the tenders must limit the number of potential bidders .In addi-tion, it is profitable for the participators to reduce the transaction costs and it is practicable for tenders to subsi -dize the bidders to encourage their participation in the bidding .