CAJ | 학술논문

为解决农户有效参与水利管理的合作意愿，本文基于博弈论的农户合作管理困境，首先对农户参与水利管理的单次静态博弈进行了合作意愿分析，得出农户在合作的单次博弈中必将陷入两难困境，导致个人理性和集体理性产生冲突，农户产生“搭便车”的倾向，且农户集体之间的合作难以达成。其次，基于不完全信息和有限理性的研究假设，再次对农户所处的两难困境进行重复动态博弈分析，推演出农户参与水利管理的合作意愿主要来自政府的有效激励机制设计及承诺。最后，本文以浙江省为例，对500个农户参与水利管理的合作意愿进行了实地调查，结果显示与农户合作博弈过程中的研究结论相符，并据此得出相应的对策及建议。
위해결농호유효삼여수리관리적합작의원，본문기우박혁론적농호합작관리곤경，수선대농호삼여수리관리적단차정태박혁진행료합작의원분석，득출농호재합작적단차박혁중필장함입량난곤경，도치개인이성화집체이성산생충돌，농호산생“탑편차”적경향，차농호집체지간적합작난이체성。기차，기우불완전신식화유한이성적연구가설，재차대농호소처적량난곤경진행중복동태박혁분석，추연출농호삼여수리관리적합작의원주요래자정부적유효격려궤제설계급승낙。최후，본문이절강성위례，대500개농호삼여수리관리적합작의원진행료실지조사，결과현시여농호합작박혁과정중적연구결론상부，병거차득출상응적대책급건의。
In order to make farmers willing to participate in water management effectively based on game theory about coope-rative and managerial difficulty in village, the relevant department first carries on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management and finds that farmers get into two kinds of Prisoners' Dilemma , which can lead to individualrationality conflicting with collective rationality, in a single game. Therefore, farmers would have a tendency to "free rides", and it is difficult to achieve cooperation among them. Later, based on the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, and carried on the famers' repeated dynamic game in order to try to break the two kinds of prisoners' dilemma, the result is that famers' willingness to cooperate to participate in water management is from effective well-designed incentive system and commitment of the government. Finally, in order to guarantee the rationality of the study, a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in Zhejiang Province is processed , and the case is confirmed that the study is reasonable. Also, there are six important conclusions come out through the analysis of the full text.