CAJ | 학술논문

本文在对国内外文献进行充分回顾的基础上，立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景，以国有上市公司为研究样本，检验了管理层权力对上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。在此基础上，本文利用回归模型对上市公司的业绩进行了分离，经验证据发现，在管理层权力的影响下，高管薪酬与上市公司非正常业绩之间存在显著的正相关关系，与此同时，高管薪酬与上市公司的正常业绩之间的相关性却明显减弱。
본문재대국내외문헌진행충분회고적기출상，립족우중국자본시장적특수제도배경，이국유상시공사위연구양본，검험료관리층권력대상시공사신수업적민감성적영향。재차기출상，본문이용회귀모형대상시공사적업적진행료분리，경험증거발현，재관리층권력적영향하，고관신수여상시공사비정상업적지간존재현저적정상관관계，여차동시，고관신수여상시공사적정상업적지간적상관성각명현감약。
Based on a review of documents home and abroad, based on the special system background of Chinese capital market, with state - owned listed companies as sample, this paper testifies the effect of management power on the sensitiveness of listed company compensation performance. On this basis, this paper separates the listed company performance with regression model. The results show that under the influence of management power, the relationship between executive compensation and abnormal performance of listed company is positive. Meanwhile, executive compensation and listed company's normal performance is obviously weakening.