林业经济问题
林業經濟問題
임업경제문제
PROBLEMS OF FORESTRY ECONOMICS
2014年
1期
43-49
,共7页
集体林权流转%演化博弈%中间人%资产评估%林权流转政策
集體林權流轉%縯化博弈%中間人%資產評估%林權流轉政策
집체림권류전%연화박혁%중간인%자산평고%림권류전정책
transfer of collective forest right%evolutionary game theory%forest intermediator%asset evaluation%policy of collective forest right transfer
运用演化博弈方法对集体林权流转过程中各利益相关方的博弈关系进行分析的结果表明：林业中间人运作成本、林农的法律意识以及来自政府的监管等因素直接影响林业中间人与林权资产评估机构诚信行为的选择，进而决定集体林权流转市场形态在初级阶段的演化方向。基于此，提出严控林业公职人员市场禁入、优化林权评估委托制度及林区普法工作、构建林权社会化服务平台等政策建议。
運用縯化博弈方法對集體林權流轉過程中各利益相關方的博弈關繫進行分析的結果錶明：林業中間人運作成本、林農的法律意識以及來自政府的鑑管等因素直接影響林業中間人與林權資產評估機構誠信行為的選擇，進而決定集體林權流轉市場形態在初級階段的縯化方嚮。基于此，提齣嚴控林業公職人員市場禁入、優化林權評估委託製度及林區普法工作、構建林權社會化服務平檯等政策建議。
운용연화박혁방법대집체림권류전과정중각이익상관방적박혁관계진행분석적결과표명：임업중간인운작성본、임농적법률의식이급래자정부적감관등인소직접영향임업중간인여림권자산평고궤구성신행위적선택，진이결정집체림권류전시장형태재초급계단적연화방향。기우차，제출엄공임업공직인원시장금입、우화림권평고위탁제도급림구보법공작、구건림권사회화복무평태등정책건의。
Analysis of game relationship by applying evolutionary game theory on all interest parties in the process of collective forest right transfer indicate:The evolutionary path of the collective forest right transfer market changes, because that factors , such as operating cost of forestry intermediator , the legal consciousness of forestry farmers and the government s'supervision , affect mutual behavioral choices between forestry intermediator and asset evaluation institute .Advices based on the exploration are banning the forestry officials from entering the collective forest right transfer market ,optimizing for-est right evaluation system and the legal work in forest district , constructing socialized service plat -forms of forest rights .
