武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)
武漢理工大學學報(信息與管理工程版)
무한리공대학학보(신식여관리공정판)
JOURNAL OF WUHAN AUTOMOTIVE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
2014年
3期
397-400,413
,共5页
演化博弈%汽车售后%复制动态方程%产业链
縯化博弈%汽車售後%複製動態方程%產業鏈
연화박혁%기차수후%복제동태방정%산업련
evolutionary game theory%auto after-sales service%replicated dynamics equation%industry chain
基于演化博弈理论,在利益均分和成本共担的假设前提下,引入激励与惩罚系数,并建立了群体博弈模型,对汽车售后O2O( online-to-offline)市场中的服务商合作行为进行了分析。通过推导复制动态方程得到的分析结果表明,在汽车售后O2 O市场群体博弈模型中,成本、收益、激励与惩罚系数,以及初始合作者比例都是影响演化博弈稳定性的因素,根据实际情况设置合理的参数可以有效引导各方的行为。
基于縯化博弈理論,在利益均分和成本共擔的假設前提下,引入激勵與懲罰繫數,併建立瞭群體博弈模型,對汽車售後O2O( online-to-offline)市場中的服務商閤作行為進行瞭分析。通過推導複製動態方程得到的分析結果錶明,在汽車售後O2 O市場群體博弈模型中,成本、收益、激勵與懲罰繫數,以及初始閤作者比例都是影響縯化博弈穩定性的因素,根據實際情況設置閤理的參數可以有效引導各方的行為。
기우연화박혁이론,재이익균분화성본공담적가설전제하,인입격려여징벌계수,병건립료군체박혁모형,대기차수후O2O( online-to-offline)시장중적복무상합작행위진행료분석。통과추도복제동태방정득도적분석결과표명,재기차수후O2 O시장군체박혁모형중,성본、수익、격려여징벌계수,이급초시합작자비례도시영향연화박혁은정성적인소,근거실제정황설치합리적삼수가이유효인도각방적행위。
Based on evolutionary game theory and with the hypothesis of cost -shared and profit -shared as premise , a group game model was built after introducing the incentive and punishment coefficient , by which the cooperation behaviors of service providers in auto after -sales O2O (online to offline) market were analyzed.The game result derived from the replicated dynamic equation showed that:in the automotive after-sales O2O market group game model , the costs and benefits , incentive and penalty coefficient , as well as the initial cooperation ratio were all factors affecting the stability of evolutionary game .The rea-sonable settings set according to the actual situation would effectively guide the behavior of the parties .