CAJ | 학술논문

以2006年公告股权激励方案的上市公司为研究对象，运用其股权激励方案公告后3年的相关数据，基于应计项目与线下项目盈余管理的双重计量视角，实证分析股权激励契约的设计对激励后公司盈余管理方式与强度的影响。研究发现：股权激励方案公告后，相关公司应计项目和线下项目的盈余管理都存在，且公司管理层倾向于实施应计项目盈余管理方式。相对于实施业绩股票模式的公司，实施股票期权模式公司的线下项目盈余管理会显著减少，而应计项目盈余管理减少不明显。激励规模越大，行权条件设计的越严格，无论是应计项目还是线下项目盈余管理均会增强。激励计划的有效期设计的越长，线下项目盈余管理会显著减少，应计项目盈余管理减少不明显。
이2006년공고고권격려방안적상시공사위연구대상，운용기고권격려방안공고후3년적상관수거，기우응계항목여선하항목영여관리적쌍중계량시각，실증분석고권격려계약적설계대격려후공사영여관리방식여강도적영향。연구발현：고권격려방안공고후，상관공사응계항목화선하항목적영여관리도존재，차공사관리층경향우실시응계항목영여관리방식。상대우실시업적고표모식적공사，실시고표기권모식공사적선하항목영여관리회현저감소，이응계항목영여관리감소불명현。격려규모월대，행권조건설계적월엄격，무론시응계항목환시선하항목영여관리균회증강。격려계화적유효기설계적월장，선하항목영여관리회현저감소，응계항목영여관리감소불명현。
This essay takes companies which made public their equity incentive contract in 2006 as subject, collects relevant data in the successive three years, and empirically analyzes the influence of the dequity incentive contract on the methods and profoundness of the control of earnings The research reveals that, after the publication of equity incentive contract, control of earnings is conducted for both accruals and below-the-lines, and the executives tend to exert control of earnings on accruals. Compared with companies which employ performance shares mode, companies which employ the stock option mode show significant reduction in the control of earnings of below-the-lines, while there is no significant re-duction in the control of earnings for accruals. The larger the scale of incentive is, the more stern the control of earnings for accruals and below-the-lines will be.