CAJ | 학술논문

在外生的排放税的条件下，将补贴和合作两种技术激励政策分别应用在节能减排技术研发即生产工艺研发和污染减排研发上。通过建立政府和企业之间的互动博弈模型，分析比较两种政策下的研发水平、利润和社会福利。研究发现：（1）当生产工艺研发溢出率较低时，补贴政策下的生产工艺研发水平高于合作政策下的生产工艺研发水平；当生产工艺研发溢出率较高时，刚好相反。（2）当排放税率小于临界税率，补贴政策下的污染减排研发水平高于合作政策下的污染减排研发水平；当排放税率大于临界税率，结论相反。研究结果为政府选择正确的技术激励政策、企业选择正确的研发行为提供有力的理论支撑。
재외생적배방세적조건하，장보첩화합작량충기술격려정책분별응용재절능감배기술연발즉생산공예연발화오염감배연발상。통과건립정부화기업지간적호동박혁모형，분석비교량충정책하적연발수평、리윤화사회복리。연구발현：（1）당생산공예연발일출솔교저시，보첩정책하적생산공예연발수평고우합작정책하적생산공예연발수평；당생산공예연발일출솔교고시，강호상반。（2）당배방세솔소우림계세솔，보첩정책하적오염감배연발수평고우합작정책하적오염감배연발수평；당배방세솔대우림계세솔，결론상반。연구결과위정부선택정학적기술격려정책、기업선택정학적연발행위제공유력적이론지탱。
Two technology incentive policies,that are subsidies and cooperation,are put to use in technology R&D of ener-gy saving and emission reduction which includes production engineering R&D and pollution emission reduction R&D under the condition of exogenous emission tax. A game model of mutual action between government and firms is built to compare R&D,profit and social welfare. It can be found that:①When spillover rate of production engineering R&D is low,the lev-el of production engineering R&D under subsidies policy is higher than under cooperation policy;when spillover rate of pro-duction engineering R&D is high,the level of production engineering R&D under cooperation policy is higher than under subsidies policy.②When discharge rate is less than critical rate,the level of pollution emission reduction R&D under sub-sidies policy is higher than under cooperation policy;When discharge rate is higher than critical rate,the level of pollution emission reduction R&D under cooperation policy is higher than under subsidies policy. The research result will provide theory support for government to choose correct technology incentive policy and for firms to choose correct R&D behavior.