CAJ | 학술논문

在考虑零售商销售边际成本以及供应链缺货惩罚成本的前提下，针对市场为一般随机需求的情况，本文首先论证了传统回购契约在协调供应链时的不合理性，然后在考虑供应链参与双方谈判能力的基础上，建立了基于不对称 Nash协商模型的回购契约机制，并证明了此机制在协调供应链的同时可以使得零售商和供应商的收益都得到改善，最后通过数值分析验证了所得到的理论成果。
재고필령수상소수변제성본이급공응련결화징벌성본적전제하，침대시장위일반수궤수구적정황，본문수선론증료전통회구계약재협조공응련시적불합이성，연후재고필공응련삼여쌍방담판능력적기출상，건립료기우불대칭 Nash협상모형적회구계약궤제，병증명료차궤제재협조공응련적동시가이사득령수상화공응상적수익도득도개선，최후통과수치분석험증료소득도적이론성과。
Considering retailer’s sale cost and the penalty cost of stockout,for random demand,this paper demonstrates the irrationality of the traditional buy-back contract,then establishes a new buy-back contract based on asymmetric Nash bargaining model with the participants’bargaining power in considera-tion.We demonstrate that this new contract can not only coordinate the supply chain,but also improve re-tailers’and suppliers’revenue.Some numerical experiments examining the results are obtained.