CAJ | 학술논문

信贷渠道是我国货币政策传导的主要途径,其传导效果依赖于企业对银行贷款的依赖性。基于我国中小企业对银行贷款的依赖性较低这一现实状况,本文运用不完全信息动态博弈模型,分析了商业银行与中小企业之间的信贷博弈,结果表明,在紧缩的政策下,并不是银行＂惜贷＂,而是企业＂惜借＂而转向民间渠道,信贷渠道对于投资的调控力度大大减弱;相反,在扩张政策下,中小企业都＂抢贷＂,信贷渠道对于投资的扩张效应就大大增强。这样就造成了信贷渠道传导效果的扭曲,导致货币政策易放难收。本文继而对2008年至2011年我国货币政策与银行新增贷款规模进行观测,结果与理论相符。最后,本文对这一现状提出相关的政策建议。
신대거도시아국화폐정책전도적주요도경,기전도효과의뢰우기업대은행대관적의뢰성。기우아국중소기업대은행대관적의뢰성교저저일현실상황,본문운용불완전신식동태박혁모형,분석료상업은행여중소기업지간적신대박혁,결과표명,재긴축적정책하,병불시은행＂석대＂,이시기업＂석차＂이전향민간거도,신대거도대우투자적조공력도대대감약;상반,재확장정책하,중소기업도＂창대＂,신대거도대우투자적확장효응취대대증강。저양취조성료신대거도전도효과적뉴곡,도치화폐정책역방난수。본문계이대2008년지2011년아국화폐정책여은행신증대관규모진행관측,결과여이론상부。최후,본문대저일현상제출상관적정책건의。
The credit channel is the main way of monetary policy transmission in China. This paper is aimed at exploring the effect of credit transmit channel of monetary policy, which relies on the enterprise dependence on bank loan. In China, such depen- dence of Medium and Small Enterprises (SEMs) is low. With the dynamic game model of incomplete information, the paper examined the credit game between commercial banks and SEMs. The results showed that under deflation policy, SEMs were "not willing to bor- row" and turned to private lending, which could not be controlled by the policy, so that policy effect was much weakened. On the contrary, SMEs "robbed to borrow" under ex- pansionary policy, leading to strong policy effect. Then, this paper observed the monetary policies and the scale of increased bank loans from 2008 to 2011 in China, and found the same result. Finally, suggestions were given according to this result.