CAJ | 학술논문

在频谱拍卖机制设计中，最关键的挑战是在满足主用户的利益及次用户的频谱需求的同时提高频谱利用率。然而，如果某些次用户通过抬高出价以获得多于他真实需求的频谱资源，采用现有频谱拍卖机制可能会导致较低的真实频谱利用率。通过引入真实频谱利用率，提出了一个新的频谱拍卖机制来解决这类问题。该拍卖机制为拍卖者提供了一个在真实频谱利用率及社会福利/收入间取得权衡的机制，设计了多项式时间复杂度的针对单信道及多信道的诚信拍卖算法。实验表明，该拍卖机制可以极大地提高真实频谱利用率。
재빈보박매궤제설계중，최관건적도전시재만족주용호적이익급차용호적빈보수구적동시제고빈보이용솔。연이，여과모사차용호통과태고출개이획득다우타진실수구적빈보자원，채용현유빈보박매궤제가능회도치교저적진실빈보이용솔。통과인입진실빈보이용솔，제출료일개신적빈보박매궤제래해결저류문제。해박매궤제위박매자제공료일개재진실빈보이용솔급사회복리/수입간취득권형적궤제，설계료다항식시간복잡도적침대단신도급다신도적성신박매산법。실험표명，해박매궤제가이겁대지제고진실빈보이용솔。
The key challenge in the spectrum auction design is how to efficiently improve the spectrum utilization, which requires leveraging the profit of primary users and the spectrum requirements of secondary users. However, existing spectrum auctions always cause low real spectrum utilization, if some secondary users prefer to monopolize the secondary spectrum access right with high bids which is inconsistent with their true spectrum requirements. To address this problem, through integrating real spectrum utilization, this paper presents a novel real spectrum utili-zation based auction mechanism named U-Auction. This paper provides a framework for auctioneer to leverage the tradeoff between real spectrum utilization and social welfare/revenue. This paper also designs polynomial-time truthful spectrum auction mechanisms to support the auction optimization for both single and multiple channels allocation scenarios in U-Auction. Simulation results show that U-Auction can significantly improve the real spectrum utilization.