CAJ | 학술논문

利用演化博弈中的动态复制方法，以城市内城区的机动交通群与非机动交通群为研究对象，对机动交通与非机动交通随机配对后，根据鹰鸽博弈的思想建立了博弈双方的收益矩阵。讨论了交通执法频率、范围和力度等模型参数，易发生交通拥堵路段的机动交通与非机动交通违规选择的影响，解释了城市交通拥堵的部分原因：出行者的个人素质因素和地方政府交通执法因素。
이용연화박혁중적동태복제방법，이성시내성구적궤동교통군여비궤동교통군위연구대상，대궤동교통여비궤동교통수궤배대후，근거응합박혁적사상건립료박혁쌍방적수익구진。토론료교통집법빈솔、범위화력도등모형삼수，역발생교통옹도로단적궤동교통여비궤동교통위규선택적영향，해석료성시교통옹도적부분원인：출행자적개인소질인소화지방정부교통집법인소。
By using of the evolutionary game theory based on bounded rationality,proposes a dynamic unsymmetrical replicating model of motorized and non -motorized transport.Motorized and non -motorized transport are randomly paired based on the idea of hawk-dove game payoff matrix of the game.This paper discusses the impact of the model parameters the traffic enforcement frequency,scope and intensity of the city.The reasons of urban traffic congestion have been explained the traveler's personal quality factors and local government traffic enforcement factors.