CAJ | 학술논문

针对随机合作对策解的问题，提出了妥协值概念，并通过一个例子证明妥协值作为随机合作对策解的可行性与合理性。得到随机合作对策的妥协值所满足的性质，研究了随机合作对策的妥协值与TU对策的τ值以及妥协值与边际值之间的关系。研究结果表明：对于两个局中人组成的联盟，随机合作对策的妥协值等于边际值。当局中人的个数超过两个时，这个结论不一定成立。
침대수궤합작대책해적문제，제출료타협치개념，병통과일개례자증명타협치작위수궤합작대책해적가행성여합이성。득도수궤합작대책적타협치소만족적성질，연구료수궤합작대책적타협치여TU대책적τ치이급타협치여변제치지간적관계。연구결과표명：대우량개국중인조성적련맹，수궤합작대책적타협치등우변제치。당국중인적개수초과량개시，저개결론불일정성립。
This paper focuses on the compromise value of stochastic cooperative games. An example is offered to illustrate the feasibility and rationality of the compromise value which is defined as the solution of stochastic cooperative games. The properties of which the compromise value is satisfied can be obtained from this paper. This paper further studied the relationship between the compromise value and the τ-value, and the relationship between the compromise value and marginal value. The result of study shows that for a two-person stochastic cooperative game, the compromise value is equivalent to its marginal value. When the number of players is more than two, the conclusion above does not necessarily stand.