CAJ | 학술논문

　　委托代理理论是现代公司治理的逻辑起点，而委托代理理论中的代理成本受多方面因素影响。文章分析了“剩余损失”中的风险成本与激励成本所构成的代理成本，在传统分布函数的参数化方法的基础上进行简化和扩张，深入研究委托代理理论中的代理成本控制。企业的代理成本，不仅受到代理人的努力程度的影响，还将会受到其他与产出有关的因素的影响，因此加入其他与产出有关的因素将会增加激励性，减少代理成本。
　　위탁대리이론시현대공사치리적라집기점，이위탁대리이론중적대리성본수다방면인소영향。문장분석료“잉여손실”중적풍험성본여격려성본소구성적대리성본，재전통분포함수적삼수화방법적기출상진행간화화확장，심입연구위탁대리이론중적대리성본공제。기업적대리성본，불부수도대리인적노력정도적영향，환장회수도기타여산출유관적인소적영향，인차가입기타여산출유관적인소장회증가격려성，감소대리성본。
Principal-agent theory is the logical starting point of modern corporate governance, and agency cost of the theory affected by various factors. The paper analyzes the risk cost of "residual loss" and agency cost consisting of incentive cost, simplify and expand it on the basis of parametric method of traditional distribution function, and study the agency cost of prin-cipal-agent theory in-depth. The agency cost of enterprise not only affects the agent level of effort, also will be affected by other factors related to the output. So joining other factors related to the output will increase the inspiration and reduce agency costs.