电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）
電子科技大學學報（社會科學版）
전자과기대학학보（사회과학판）
JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITY OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION)
2014年
3期
46-49,88
,共5页
风险规避%行为模型%不确定条件%个性化产品
風險規避%行為模型%不確定條件%箇性化產品
풍험규피%행위모형%불학정조건%개성화산품
risk aversion%behavioral model%uncertainty condition%personalized product
研究在不确定条件下，决策者风险规避行为对决策的影响，利用前景理论对决策者的风险规避行为进行建模，分析风险规避决策者的决策值与完全理性决策者的决策最优值的偏差。并以个性化产品销售企业最佳提货时间设置为例，通过建模和分析发现：当货物提前到达的边际损失大于延时到达的边际损失时，决策者越是进行风险规避，他设置的提货时间就越比风险中立者设置的最优提货时间小；当货物提前到达的边际损失和延时到达的边际损失相等时，不管决策者如何进行风险规避，他设置的提货时间都和风险中立者设置的最优提货时间相等；当货物提前到达的边际损失小于延时到达的边际损失时，决策者越是进行风险规避，他设置的提货时间就越比风险中立者设置的最优提货时间大。
研究在不確定條件下，決策者風險規避行為對決策的影響，利用前景理論對決策者的風險規避行為進行建模，分析風險規避決策者的決策值與完全理性決策者的決策最優值的偏差。併以箇性化產品銷售企業最佳提貨時間設置為例，通過建模和分析髮現：噹貨物提前到達的邊際損失大于延時到達的邊際損失時，決策者越是進行風險規避，他設置的提貨時間就越比風險中立者設置的最優提貨時間小；噹貨物提前到達的邊際損失和延時到達的邊際損失相等時，不管決策者如何進行風險規避，他設置的提貨時間都和風險中立者設置的最優提貨時間相等；噹貨物提前到達的邊際損失小于延時到達的邊際損失時，決策者越是進行風險規避，他設置的提貨時間就越比風險中立者設置的最優提貨時間大。
연구재불학정조건하，결책자풍험규피행위대결책적영향，이용전경이론대결책자적풍험규피행위진행건모，분석풍험규피결책자적결책치여완전이성결책자적결책최우치적편차。병이개성화산품소수기업최가제화시간설치위례，통과건모화분석발현：당화물제전도체적변제손실대우연시도체적변제손실시，결책자월시진행풍험규피，타설치적제화시간취월비풍험중립자설치적최우제화시간소；당화물제전도체적변제손실화연시도체적변제손실상등시，불관결책자여하진행풍험규피，타설치적제화시간도화풍험중립자설치적최우제화시간상등；당화물제전도체적변제손실소우연시도체적변제손실시，결책자월시진행풍험규피，타설치적제화시간취월비풍험중립자설치적최우제화시간대。
This paper studies the effect of the decision maker’s risk-averse behavior on the decision under uncertainty condition, uses the prospect theory to model the decision maker’s behavior, and analyzes the decision bias between the risk-averse decision maker and the complete rational decision maker. It takes the optimal delivery product time of personalized product marketing establishment as an example. Through modeling and analyzing, we find that if the marginal loss of the product coming before delivery time is larger than the marginal loss of the product coming after delivery time, then the more risk-averse decision maker is, the smaller delivery time he sets is than the optimal value of the risk neutral maker;if the marginal loss of the product coming before delivery time is equal to the marginal loss of the product coming after delivery time, no matter how risk-averse he is, the delivery time he sets is equal to the optimal value of the risk neutral maker; if the marginal loss of the product coming before delivery time is smaller than the marginal loss of the product coming after delivery time, then the more risk-averse decision maker is, the larger delivery time he sets is than the optimal value of the risk neutral maker.
