中国软科学
中國軟科學
중국연과학
CHINA SOFT SCIENCE
2014年
5期
118-128
,共11页
风险投资%董事会规模%董事会结构%IPO公司%倾向评分匹配法
風險投資%董事會規模%董事會結構%IPO公司%傾嚮評分匹配法
풍험투자%동사회규모%동사회결구%IPO공사%경향평분필배법
Venture Capital%Board Size%Board Independence%IPO Companies%Propensity Score Matching
论文分析风险投资(简称风投)选择被投资公司的影响因素、风投持股比例和质量对IPO公司董事会规模和结构的影响。论文以2004-2011年在深圳证券交易所中小板的IPO公司为初始样本,采用倾向评分匹配法为有风投支持公司匹配了一组没有风投支持的公司,共同形成本文的样本。研究结果表明,风投倾向于选择CEO持股比例高、CEO学历在本科以上、销售增长快、董事会规模大的公司。同时,风投持股比例和IPO公司董事会规模显著正相关,表明风投有参与IPO公司治理的动机,并通过进入公司董事会得以实现;风投持股比例和IPO公司董事会独立性正相关,但不显著,表明风投发挥监督作用的能力有限。进一步的研究表明高质量风投支持的IPO公司有较大的董事会规模,但高质量风投并不显著提高董事会独立性。研究丰富了有关我国风投和IPO公司治理的文献,同时为我国监管层、IPO公司提供了决策支持。
論文分析風險投資(簡稱風投)選擇被投資公司的影響因素、風投持股比例和質量對IPO公司董事會規模和結構的影響。論文以2004-2011年在深圳證券交易所中小闆的IPO公司為初始樣本,採用傾嚮評分匹配法為有風投支持公司匹配瞭一組沒有風投支持的公司,共同形成本文的樣本。研究結果錶明,風投傾嚮于選擇CEO持股比例高、CEO學歷在本科以上、銷售增長快、董事會規模大的公司。同時,風投持股比例和IPO公司董事會規模顯著正相關,錶明風投有參與IPO公司治理的動機,併通過進入公司董事會得以實現;風投持股比例和IPO公司董事會獨立性正相關,但不顯著,錶明風投髮揮鑑督作用的能力有限。進一步的研究錶明高質量風投支持的IPO公司有較大的董事會規模,但高質量風投併不顯著提高董事會獨立性。研究豐富瞭有關我國風投和IPO公司治理的文獻,同時為我國鑑管層、IPO公司提供瞭決策支持。
논문분석풍험투자(간칭풍투)선택피투자공사적영향인소、풍투지고비례화질량대IPO공사동사회규모화결구적영향。논문이2004-2011년재심수증권교역소중소판적IPO공사위초시양본,채용경향평분필배법위유풍투지지공사필배료일조몰유풍투지지적공사,공동형성본문적양본。연구결과표명,풍투경향우선택CEO지고비례고、CEO학력재본과이상、소수증장쾌、동사회규모대적공사。동시,풍투지고비례화IPO공사동사회규모현저정상관,표명풍투유삼여IPO공사치리적동궤,병통과진입공사동사회득이실현;풍투지고비례화IPO공사동사회독립성정상관,단불현저,표명풍투발휘감독작용적능력유한。진일보적연구표명고질량풍투지지적IPO공사유교대적동사회규모,단고질량풍투병불현저제고동사회독립성。연구봉부료유관아국풍투화IPO공사치리적문헌,동시위아국감관층、IPO공사제공료결책지지。
This study empirically tests the determinants of venture capitals ( VCs ) to choose investee companies and their impacts on the size and independence of IPO companies’ board. Based on the companies that were listed in the small and middle-sized enterprise board during 2004-2011, we adopt propensity score matching method to match the companies backed by VCs with these without VCs. Based on the two groups of companies, we find that VCs are more likely to choose companies with higher percentage of CEOs’ ownership, CEOs having higher academic degrees, higher sales growth, and larger board size. Meanwhile, we find that VCs’ ownership is positively and significantly related to board size, which shows that VCs have motivations to play their role in the corporate governance of IPO companies, and achieve their objectives through being board members. However, VCs’ ownership has a positive but not significant rela-tionship with board independence, which indicates that VCs’ monitoring role in corporate governance is limited. Further tests show that IPO companies backed by high quality VCs have larger board size, while high quality VCs do not have a significant impact on board independence. Our study enriches the literature on Chinese venture capitals and corporate governance of IPO companies and provides supports for China’s regulators and IPO companies to make their decisions.