CAJ | 학술논문

城中村是我国快速发展城市化进程的特有产物，其所暴露的问题日趋严重，具有进行改造的必要性。城中村的改造本质是利益的再分配，能否有效协调各利益相关者的利益是城中村改造的关键问题。该文以政府主导模式为例，并运用进化博弈论构造了政府、村民两个利益相关者参与的进化博弈模型，分析器博弈过程和均衡结果，针对其情况提出相应对策，为政府进行改造城中村提供理论依据。
성중촌시아국쾌속발전성시화진정적특유산물，기소폭로적문제일추엄중，구유진행개조적필요성。성중촌적개조본질시이익적재분배，능부유효협조각이익상관자적이익시성중촌개조적관건문제。해문이정부주도모식위례，병운용진화박혁론구조료정부、촌민량개이익상관자삼여적진화박혁모형，분석기박혁과정화균형결과，침대기정황제출상응대책，위정부진행개조성중촌제공이론의거。
The urban village is a special product of China's rapid urbanization process ,The problems of urban villages are getting more and more serious and it is necessary to reform .The transformation of the urban villages is how to redistribute the essen-tially interests ,therefore whether we can coordinate the various interests of different people is important for the success of the process .This paper takes the government-leading model as an example ,by using evolutionary game theory .The purpose is to analyze the game process between government and the villagers .The paper proposed corresponding countermeasures according to the situation to provide theoretical basis for the government to reconstruct urban villages .