CAJ | 학술논문

大型游乐设施安装监理与业主之间存在非对称信息，由此会引发“逆向选择”和“道德风险”。根据分布函数的参数化方法，建立业主与安装监理的委托代理模型，分析得出业主在信息不对称情况下需要额外支付监理单位剩余索取权。运用迭代方法解决委托代理模型中信息不对称的问题，并以某游乐园二期设备安装项目为例，通过对比不同监理形式的收益情况，验证了迭代方法可有效降低信息不对称的程度，以利于获取最大净收益。
대형유악설시안장감리여업주지간존재비대칭신식，유차회인발“역향선택”화“도덕풍험”。근거분포함수적삼수화방법，건립업주여안장감리적위탁대리모형，분석득출업주재신식불대칭정황하수요액외지부감리단위잉여색취권。운용질대방법해결위탁대리모형중신식불대칭적문제，병이모유악완이기설비안장항목위례，통과대비불동감리형식적수익정황，험증료질대방법가유효강저신식불대칭적정도，이리우획취최대정수익。
Asymmetric information problem exists between project owners and installation supervisions of large-scale recreation facilities which leads to "Adverse Selection" and "Moral Hazard". This paper establishes the Principal-agent model for the relationship between the owners and the installation supervisions based on Parameterized Distribution Formulation. Analysis on the model indicates that the owners have to pay the Residual Claim to the supervisions due to the Asymmetric information which encourages the supervisions to undertake higher cost of risk. Iterative method is used to solve the Asymmetric information problem and its validity is been verified by analyzing the equipment installation project of the second phase of an amusement park case.