CAJ | 학술논문

主要运用博弈论方法探讨制造商竞争环境下的逆向供应链奖惩机制，建立了5个决策模型，分别是逆向供应链集中式决策、以逆向供应链和不回收再制造的制造商的总利润为目标决策、逆向供应链分散式决策、政府对制造商实施奖惩机制以及政府对回收商实施奖惩机制下逆向供应链的决策模型。研究表明：竞争对回收率提高有益，竞争越激烈回收率越高；积极回收再制造的制造商的新产品零售价较低，具有价格竞争优势；奖惩制造商和奖惩回收商均能起到提高回收率的作用，奖惩力度越大，回收率越高，新产品零售价越低；奖惩制造商比奖惩回收商更能调动制造商和回收商的积极性；奖惩制造商时的回购价高于奖惩回收商时的回购价；在实施奖惩机制时，回收再制造的制造商利润高于不回收再制造的制造商的利润；不回收再制造的制造商的利润随奖惩力度的增大而降低。
주요운용박혁론방법탐토제조상경쟁배경하적역향공응련장징궤제，건립료5개결책모형，분별시역향공응련집중식결책、이역향공응련화불회수재제조적제조상적총리윤위목표결책、역향공응련분산식결책、정부대제조상실시장징궤제이급정부대회수상실시장징궤제하역향공응련적결책모형。연구표명：경쟁대회수솔제고유익，경쟁월격렬회수솔월고；적겁회수재제조적제조상적신산품령수개교저，구유개격경쟁우세；장징제조상화장징회수상균능기도제고회수솔적작용，장징력도월대，회수솔월고，신산품령수개월저；장징제조상비장징회수상경능조동제조상화회수상적적겁성；장징제조상시적회구개고우장징회수상시적회구개；재실시장징궤제시，회수재제조적제조상리윤고우불회수재제조적제조상적리윤；불회수재제조적제조상적리윤수장징력도적증대이강저。
Mainly considering the premium and penalty mechanism of reverse supply chain under manufacturers ’ competition environment, using game theory, we build 5 models, which are centralized decision-making of reverse supply chain , the total profits decision-making based on the profits of reverse supply chain and the manu-facturer who does not collect waste products , decentralized decision-making with no premium and penalty mecha-nism, government ’ s premium and penalty mechanisms for the manufacturers and recyclers of reverse supply chain.The study presents several conclusions .Competition is beneficial to raising collection rate and the more intense the competition , the higher the collection rate;the retail price of new products offered by manufacturers actively recycling is lower , which brings about price-competitive advantage .The fourth and fifth scenarios play a part in increasing collection rate , and the greater premium and penalty , the higher collection rate , the lower retail price of new products .It is more efficient for the government to offer them premium mechanism rather than the premium and penalty mechanism , sine the former is valid for increasing both the manufacturer and the collec-tor’ s enthusiasm .The buyback price of the fourth scenario is higher than that of the fifth scenario .With premi-um and penalty mechanism the profit of manufacturer who collects waste products is higher than that of manufac -turer who does not collect waste products .The profit of manufacturer , who does not collect waste products , decreases with the increase of the degree of premium and penalty .