CAJ | 학술논문

选取2007～2011年披露研发投入且数据完整的1695家上市公司为研究样本，利用层次回归分析，实证检验了高管股权激励对R＆D资本化与费用化价值相关性的影响作用。研究结果表明：高管股权激励不仅是R＆D资本化投入与股票价格的半调节变量，同时，高管股权激励也是R＆D费用化投入与股票价格的半调节变量；通过高管股权激励，可以解决监管R＆D活动中信息不对称和风险性等问题，使企业实现股东价值最大化。
선취2007～2011년피로연발투입차수거완정적1695가상시공사위연구양본，이용층차회귀분석，실증검험료고관고권격려대R＆D자본화여비용화개치상관성적영향작용。연구결과표명：고관고권격려불부시R＆D자본화투입여고표개격적반조절변량，동시，고관고권격려야시R＆D비용화투입여고표개격적반조절변량；통과고관고권격려，가이해결감관R＆D활동중신식불대칭화풍험성등문제，사기업실현고동개치최대화。
Disclosure of R&D input and complete data of 1695 listed companies from 2007-201 1 have been selected as re-search samples,using hierarchical regression analysis,empirically the executive equity incentive influence the R&D capitali-zation and expensing value relevance.The research results show that the executive equity incentive is the half adjustment variables between the capitalization of R&D investment and stock price and the executive equity incentive is the half adjust-ment between expensed R&D investment and stock prices.By executive equity incentive regulation,such problems as infor-mation asymmetry and risk of R&D activities can be solved,making the enterprise to maximize shareholder value.