CAJ | 학술논문

通过运用传统的两阶段博弈模型对垄断厂商出租和出售耐用品进行对比分析可知，与出售相比，垄断厂商更加偏好出租。石磊-寇宗来模型也有一定不足，需着重分析加入道德风险、进入威胁和可置信承诺的条件后，耐用品垄断厂商出租和出售耐用品的最优选择问题。研究结果说明：首先，道德风险使垄断厂商在出租耐用品时承担额外的成本，在该成本大于临界道德风险成本时，垄断厂商将选择出售；反之亦然。其次，进入威胁会促使垄断厂商选择出售耐用品以占领部分市场，阻碍潜在竞争者进入。最后，垄断厂商做出不降价的可置信承诺能提高出售耐用品时的利润，加速资金流转。
통과운용전통적량계단박혁모형대롱단엄상출조화출수내용품진행대비분석가지，여출수상비，롱단엄상경가편호출조。석뢰-구종래모형야유일정불족，수착중분석가입도덕풍험、진입위협화가치신승낙적조건후，내용품롱단엄상출조화출수내용품적최우선택문제。연구결과설명：수선，도덕풍험사롱단엄상재출조내용품시승담액외적성본，재해성본대우림계도덕풍험성본시，롱단엄상장선택출수；반지역연。기차，진입위협회촉사롱단엄상선택출수내용품이점령부분시장，조애잠재경쟁자진입。최후，롱단엄상주출불강개적가치신승낙능제고출수내용품시적리윤，가속자금류전。
By using a two-stage game model,this paper analyses durable goods monopolist’s business strategy choice,and makes a reasonable explanation on the realistic question.It turns out that compared with sale,monopolist prefers to lease.But in reality,there are three factors against leasing.The first one is moral hazard,which makes monopolist bear the additional costs when leasing durable goods,and greatly reduces the enthusiasm of leasing.The second one is potential entrant that would lead to the choice to sell durable goods for monopolist,in order to capture the market share and to prevent potential competitors entering the market.The last one is credible commitment,if monopolist is able to make a credible commitment to resist cutting its prices,it can improve the profit of selling durable goods and accelerate cash flow.