CAJ | 학술논문

考虑由一个再制造商和两个具有价格竞争与不对称成本信息的第三方回收商构成的二级逆向供应链，以博弈论为基础，分析了有无信息泄露两种情形下逆向供应链成员的最优回收定价问题，在此基础上给出了再制造商信息泄露的产生机理。结果表明：当主导回收商为高成本类型时，再制造商总会选择不将主导回收商的信息泄露给跟随回收商；而当主导回收商为低成本类型，再制造商的泄露信息决策行为依赖于主导回收商属于高成本类型的认知概率。
고필유일개재제조상화량개구유개격경쟁여불대칭성본신식적제삼방회수상구성적이급역향공응련，이박혁론위기출，분석료유무신식설로량충정형하역향공응련성원적최우회수정개문제，재차기출상급출료재제조상신식설로적산생궤리。결과표명：당주도회수상위고성본류형시，재제조상총회선택불장주도회수상적신식설로급근수회수상；이당주도회수상위저성본류형，재제조상적설로신식결책행위의뢰우주도회수상속우고성본류형적인지개솔。
We consider a two -echelon reverse supply chain composed of a remanufacturer and two third -party recyclers with recy-cling price competition and asymmetric cost information . Based on game theory , we analyze the optimal recycling pricing strategy for the remanufacturer and third-party recyclers under leaking information or not , and give the mechanism of information leakage of the remanu-facturer . The results are shown as follows . Under the high cost dominant recycler , the remanufacturer won't leak the dominant recycler's information to the follow recycler . Conversely , the remanufacturer's decision-making behavior of information leakage depends on the cog-nitive probability under the low cost dominant recycler .