CAJ | 학술논문

由单个零售商和单个供应商组成的二级供应链，零售商对供应商的批发价格具有一定的压价能力，在完全信息零售商与供应商的stackelberg博弈基础上，研究了零售商将压价率作为私有信息的不完全信息博弈的激励机制问题。供应商利用激励机制能够使零售商真实披露隐瞒的信息，从而实现系统收益最大化。最后，运用实例仿真验证了激励机制的可行性，说明激励机制设计实现了供应链整体绩效的改进。
유단개령수상화단개공응상조성적이급공응련，령수상대공응상적비발개격구유일정적압개능력，재완전신식령수상여공응상적stackelberg박혁기출상，연구료령수상장압개솔작위사유신식적불완전신식박혁적격려궤제문제。공응상이용격려궤제능구사령수상진실피로은만적신식，종이실현계통수익최대화。최후，운용실례방진험증료격려궤제적가행성，설명격려궤제설계실현료공응련정체적효적개진。
In this paper, on the basis of the Stackelberg game between the retailers and suppliers under complete information, we studied the motivation mechanism of the supply chain composed by the two where the retailers held the bargain rate as private information, by which the suppliers could encourage the retailers to disclose the information, thus maximizing the benefit of the supply chain, and at the end, demonstrated the feasibility of the motivation mechanism through a simulation.