CAJ | 학술논문

文章构建了1个供应商和2个零售商组成的供应链博弈模型，在非合作博弈框架下对比分析了不同联盟模式下供应商、零售商和供应链整体的利润变化情况，同时探讨了基于合作博弈下的Shapley值法设计出合理的利润分配机制，实现整体联盟模式合作稳定的可能性。结果表明：在非合作博弈框架下，供应商和零售商各自偏好于不同的联盟模式，供应链整体利润不能实现最大化；在合作博弈框架下，当价格敏感系数与零售商间敏感系数的比值满足一定条件时，基于Shapley值法设计的利润分配机制是保障自愿合作、实现供应链整体利润最大化的有效途径。
문장구건료1개공응상화2개령수상조성적공응련박혁모형，재비합작박혁광가하대비분석료불동련맹모식하공응상、령수상화공응련정체적리윤변화정황，동시탐토료기우합작박혁하적Shapley치법설계출합리적리윤분배궤제，실현정체련맹모식합작은정적가능성。결과표명：재비합작박혁광가하，공응상화령수상각자편호우불동적련맹모식，공응련정체리윤불능실현최대화；재합작박혁광가하，당개격민감계수여령수상간민감계수적비치만족일정조건시，기우Shapley치법설계적리윤분배궤제시보장자원합작、실현공응련정체리윤최대화적유효도경。
A game model of supply chain consisting of a supplier and tw o retailers is built , then under the framework of non-cooperative game ,the changes of supplier profits ,retailers profits and overall profit of the supply chain under different alliance modes are analyzed .The reasonable profit distribution mechanism under the framework of cooperative game is designed based on Shapley value method to achieve the possibility of co -operation stability in the overall alliance mode .The results show that ,under the framework of non-coopera-tive game ,suppliers and retailers respectively prefer different modes of alliance and the overall profit of the supply chain may not reach maximization ;under the framework of cooperative game ,when the ratio of the price-sensitive coefficient to the sensitive coefficient between retailers reaches certain degree ,the profit distri-bution mechanism based on the Shapley value method is an effective method to protect voluntary cooperation and to achieve the overall profit maximization of supply chain .