CAJ | 학술논문

论文假设市场上有使用传统能源的生厂商1和开发浅层地温能的生产商2，生产商1生产的产品绿色度较低，其价格也相应的较低，而生产商2生产的产品绿色度高，但价格较昂贵。之后，基于政府补贴的角度，利用博弈论方法，建立政府和两个生产商的博弈模型。研究结果表明，随着消费者环保意识的增强，政府提高市场最低绿色度准入值，生产商2的市场份额会逐渐增加，而生产商1的市场份额会逐渐缩小，即政府提高市场最低绿色度准入值对生厂商2更有利。
논문가설시장상유사용전통능원적생엄상1화개발천층지온능적생산상2，생산상1생산적산품록색도교저，기개격야상응적교저，이생산상2생산적산품록색도고，단개격교앙귀。지후，기우정부보첩적각도，이용박혁론방법，건립정부화량개생산상적박혁모형。연구결과표명，수착소비자배보의식적증강，정부제고시장최저록색도준입치，생산상2적시장빈액회축점증가，이생산상1적시장빈액회축점축소，즉정부제고시장최저록색도준입치대생엄상2경유리。
The article supposes that there are two kinds of manufacturer on the market ,the manufacturer of using traditional energy and shallow geothermal energy . The products of manufacturer 1 have a lower green degree , and its price is correspondingly lower . On the contrary , the green degree of the other manufacturer’s price is higher ,and its price is also expensive .Based on government subsidies ,this paper establishes a game model by considering government and two manufactures. The result shows ,with the increase of consumers’ environment -care ,increasing the lowest green access value is more advantage to the manufacturers of using shallow geothermal energy .