CAJ | 학술논문

代建制作为我国投资体制改革的新兴产物，具有传统管理模式不可比拟的优势，同时也存在特有的弊端，因此需要政府进行有效的监管。在综合分析政府投资代建制项目建设过程中政府、代建单位和承建单位三者相互关系的基础上，根据公共寻租理论，分析代建单位与承建单位发生寻租行为的动机；运用博弈论方法建立政府投资项目代建制下三方博弈的动态模型，并对代建单位与承建单位的寻租行为进行博弈分析；根据模型分析结论，从政府监管角度提出了科学治理寻租行为的政策建议和改革措施。
대건제작위아국투자체제개혁적신흥산물，구유전통관리모식불가비의적우세，동시야존재특유적폐단，인차수요정부진행유효적감관。재종합분석정부투자대건제항목건설과정중정부、대건단위화승건단위삼자상호관계적기출상，근거공공심조이론，분석대건단위여승건단위발생심조행위적동궤；운용박혁론방법건립정부투자항목대건제하삼방박혁적동태모형，병대대건단위여승건단위적심조행위진행박혁분석；근거모형분석결론，종정부감관각도제출료과학치리심조행위적정책건의화개혁조시。
Construction-agent system is emerging with the reform of investment system in China,which contains many incomparable advantages to the traditional management pattern,and it has some specific disadvantages which need effective supervision from government agency. According to rent-seeking theory,the rent-seeking incentives of construction agency and construction firm are analyzed based on the synthetic analysis on the interrelationship among the government,construction agency and construction firm.A tripartite dynamic game model is established based on game theory,and the rent-seeking motives between construction agency and construction firm are analyzed. According to the results of the model,it is suggested that the government should make scientific policies and measures to restrain the rent-seeking behaviors.