CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于委托代理理论，选取进行并购的火力发电企业为案例对象，研究股权结构对电力企业过度投资行为的影响。研究发现：对于实际控制人为地方政府的电力企业而言，当大股东“一股独大”时，企业倾向于通过并购进行过度投资；有央企背景的第二大股东参股时，即使持股比例较低，也能有效遏制企业的过度投资行为。研究结论有助于理解发电企业过度投资的诱因，对于指导发电企业减少非效率投资具有重要意义。
본문기우위탁대리이론，선취진행병구적화력발전기업위안례대상，연구고권결구대전력기업과도투자행위적영향。연구발현：대우실제공제인위지방정부적전력기업이언，당대고동“일고독대”시，기업경향우통과병구진행과도투자；유앙기배경적제이대고동삼고시，즉사지고비례교저，야능유효알제기업적과도투자행위。연구결론유조우리해발전기업과도투자적유인，대우지도발전기업감소비효솔투자구유중요의의。
Based on the Principal-agent Theory ,the article has researched the effect of ownership structure upon power enterprises’ over-investment by selecting the acquired power enterprises as case study object .The results show that ,for those enterprises whose real controllers are local government ,when big shareholders control the whole companies ,the enterprises tend to over-invest by the way of merger &acquisition ;for those enterprises whose second largest shareholders have the background of central enterprises ,even if the percentage of their ownership is relatively low ,it can help restraint the behavior of enterprises’ over-investment effectively .The findings above can contribute to understanding the causes of over-investment of power enterprises ,which has the significance of helping power enterprises reduce non-efficient investment .