管理科学
管理科學
관이과학
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA
2014年
4期
76-85
,共10页
折衷主义%支付值%让渡权%可信威胁%技术转让%竞合格局
摺衷主義%支付值%讓渡權%可信威脅%技術轉讓%競閤格跼
절충주의%지부치%양도권%가신위협%기술전양%경합격국
eclecticism%payment value%alienation rights%dependable threat%technology transfer%coopetition pattern
中国大量企业借助技术转让推进技术创新,理清技术转让谈判要素对技术转让竞合格局的影响,研究技术转让交互策略显得尤为重要。梳理已有研究,构建纳什谈判博弈模型,基于平等主义和功利主义测度局中人支付值;引入支付让渡权和可信威胁假设,基于最小化最大值理论和差分博弈求得两种新解;基于中国奇瑞汽车公司的实际数据,验证3种均衡解的存在性,探讨其差异性根源。研究结果表明,纳什谈判博弈均衡解是功利主义原则和平等主义原则的折衷;对于引进方而言,支付让渡权及可信威胁条件下的新均衡解都优于一般均衡解,而且支付让渡权相对于可信威胁对引进方更有利;3种均衡解的差异性源于3种基础性均衡理论,3种基础性均衡理论分别适用于不同的技术转让谈判情境,并产生竞合格局的差别。研究结论有助于设计技术转让攻防策略和可信威胁,强化技术转让竞合格局,提高技术转让绩效,推动引进方技术进步。
中國大量企業藉助技術轉讓推進技術創新,理清技術轉讓談判要素對技術轉讓競閤格跼的影響,研究技術轉讓交互策略顯得尤為重要。梳理已有研究,構建納什談判博弈模型,基于平等主義和功利主義測度跼中人支付值;引入支付讓渡權和可信威脅假設,基于最小化最大值理論和差分博弈求得兩種新解;基于中國奇瑞汽車公司的實際數據,驗證3種均衡解的存在性,探討其差異性根源。研究結果錶明,納什談判博弈均衡解是功利主義原則和平等主義原則的摺衷;對于引進方而言,支付讓渡權及可信威脅條件下的新均衡解都優于一般均衡解,而且支付讓渡權相對于可信威脅對引進方更有利;3種均衡解的差異性源于3種基礎性均衡理論,3種基礎性均衡理論分彆適用于不同的技術轉讓談判情境,併產生競閤格跼的差彆。研究結論有助于設計技術轉讓攻防策略和可信威脅,彊化技術轉讓競閤格跼,提高技術轉讓績效,推動引進方技術進步。
중국대량기업차조기술전양추진기술창신,리청기술전양담판요소대기술전양경합격국적영향,연구기술전양교호책략현득우위중요。소리이유연구,구건납십담판박혁모형,기우평등주의화공리주의측도국중인지부치;인입지부양도권화가신위협가설,기우최소화최대치이론화차분박혁구득량충신해;기우중국기서기차공사적실제수거,험증3충균형해적존재성,탐토기차이성근원。연구결과표명,납십담판박혁균형해시공리주의원칙화평등주의원칙적절충;대우인진방이언,지부양도권급가신위협조건하적신균형해도우우일반균형해,이차지부양도권상대우가신위협대인진방경유리;3충균형해적차이성원우3충기출성균형이론,3충기출성균형이론분별괄용우불동적기술전양담판정경,병산생경합격국적차별。연구결론유조우설계기술전양공방책략화가신위협,강화기술전양경합격국,제고기술전양적효,추동인진방기술진보。
Facing the actuality that a large number Chinese enterprises poured in technology transfer negotiation so as to propel technology innovation , it is significant to clarify influence of negotiation elements on technology transfer coopetition pattern and study mutual strategy of technology transfer negotiation .Through literature review , the paper constructed Nash negotiation game model and measured payoff level of players based on equality and utility principles respectively .Payoff alienation rights and de-pendable threat were introduced .Two new types of solutions were then acquired based on minimax theory and differential game . By means of investigation on Chery Automobile Co .Ltd in China as an example , the paper verified the existence of these three solutions and discussed their differences sources .The results indicated that Nash negotiation game equilibrium solution was a syn-thesis of the two principles ( i.e., equality and utility principles ) .The new solutions were all superior to the general one for technology licensee under the conditions of payoff alienation rights and dependable threat .Moreover , payoff alienation rights played more significant effect than dependable threat did .Differences of Nash negotiation equilibrium solutions rooted in three basic equilibrium theories , which are applied in different technology transfer negotiation situations , and led to differences in coo-petition pattern .These conclusions could help design strategy and dependable threat of technology transfer , intensify coopetition pattern, promote technology transfer performance , and drive technical progress of technology licensee .