CAJ | 학술논문

农村集体土地家庭联产承包责任制的固有缺陷和各地面临着的不同的外部经济环境，以及十八届三中全会提出的要赋予农民更多财产权利，必然会导致我国农村土地制度变迁的差异和多样化，并进一步决定了农村土地制度的绩效和不同的演化路径。本文利用基层政府、集体和农户三者之间的博弈模型，导出我国农村土地制度多样化并存的过程和原因。对基层政府利益化倾向的纠正，完善农村集体组织等措施则是我国农村土地制度实施和变迁过程中避免低效率锁定的有效措施。
농촌집체토지가정련산승포책임제적고유결함화각지면림착적불동적외부경제배경，이급십팔계삼중전회제출적요부여농민경다재산권리，필연회도치아국농촌토지제도변천적차이화다양화，병진일보결정료농촌토지제도적적효화불동적연화로경。본문이용기층정부、집체화농호삼자지간적박혁모형，도출아국농촌토지제도다양화병존적과정화원인。대기층정부이익화경향적규정，완선농촌집체조직등조시칙시아국농촌토지제도실시화변천과정중피면저효솔쇄정적유효조시。
Because of the inherent defects of Household contract responsibility system of rural collective land and the different of economic development in various regions, as well as the Third Plenary Session of 18th Central Committee proposed that more property rights should be given to farmers, will inevitably lead to the differences and diversification changes in China's rural land system, and further decides the performance and different evolutionary paths of rural land system. In this paper, we describes the emergence of diversified changes of China's rural land system and the game model among governments, the collectives and farmers, export the process and reasons for current rural land system. Correcting the interest-tendency of government, improve the rural collective organizations and other measures would be the effective measures for the implementations of China's rural land system and to avoid inefficient locking in the transition process.