运筹与管理
運籌與管理
운주여관리
OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
2014年
4期
144-157
,共14页
于洪雷%杨德礼%王建军
于洪雷%楊德禮%王建軍
우홍뢰%양덕례%왕건군
拍卖理论%关键字拍卖%均衡分析%预算约束
拍賣理論%關鍵字拍賣%均衡分析%預算約束
박매이론%관건자박매%균형분석%예산약속
auction theory%keyword auction%equilibrium analysis%budget constraint
在关键字拍卖中,广告主预算约束是影响投标策略均衡的重要因素。针对广泛应用的广义第二价格机制,分析了预算约束下的关键字拍卖均衡性质。按照广告主的点击估价和预算分布情况,将广告主划分为天然完全赢家、天然部分赢家和天然输家这三种类型,提出了广告主投标临界值与关键值的概念,基于关键字拍卖不断重复进行的特点,分别从长期视角与短期视角建立了静态模型与动态模型,研究结果表明:静态环境下拍卖存在唯一的纯策略纳什均衡;动态环境下当广告主采用最优反应投标策略时拍卖将收敛至唯一的纳什均衡点,并且动态环境下拍卖商收入不低于静态环境下的拍卖收入。数值算例的结果表明在动态环境下不同的初始报价会导致拍卖收敛至不同的均衡点。研究结果为拍卖商提供了拍卖收入预测和拍卖机制优化的决策依据。
在關鍵字拍賣中,廣告主預算約束是影響投標策略均衡的重要因素。針對廣汎應用的廣義第二價格機製,分析瞭預算約束下的關鍵字拍賣均衡性質。按照廣告主的點擊估價和預算分佈情況,將廣告主劃分為天然完全贏傢、天然部分贏傢和天然輸傢這三種類型,提齣瞭廣告主投標臨界值與關鍵值的概唸,基于關鍵字拍賣不斷重複進行的特點,分彆從長期視角與短期視角建立瞭靜態模型與動態模型,研究結果錶明:靜態環境下拍賣存在唯一的純策略納什均衡;動態環境下噹廣告主採用最優反應投標策略時拍賣將收斂至唯一的納什均衡點,併且動態環境下拍賣商收入不低于靜態環境下的拍賣收入。數值算例的結果錶明在動態環境下不同的初始報價會導緻拍賣收斂至不同的均衡點。研究結果為拍賣商提供瞭拍賣收入預測和拍賣機製優化的決策依據。
재관건자박매중,엄고주예산약속시영향투표책략균형적중요인소。침대엄범응용적엄의제이개격궤제,분석료예산약속하적관건자박매균형성질。안조엄고주적점격고개화예산분포정황,장엄고주화분위천연완전영가、천연부분영가화천연수가저삼충류형,제출료엄고주투표림계치여관건치적개념,기우관건자박매불단중복진행적특점,분별종장기시각여단기시각건립료정태모형여동태모형,연구결과표명:정태배경하박매존재유일적순책략납십균형;동태배경하당엄고주채용최우반응투표책략시박매장수렴지유일적납십균형점,병차동태배경하박매상수입불저우정태배경하적박매수입。수치산례적결과표명재동태배경하불동적초시보개회도치박매수렴지불동적균형점。연구결과위박매상제공료박매수입예측화박매궤제우화적결책의거。
Advertiser ’ s budget constraint is an important factor which affects the bidding strategy equilibrium in keyword auctions .This research analyzes the equilibrium of budgeted keyword auction with the widely used gen -eralized second price mechanism .The advertisers are divided into three types “born full winner” “born partial winner” “born loser” in accordance with the distribution of their click values and budgets , and the concepts“critical bids” and“key bids” are developed .Based on the repeated characteristic of keyword auctions the static model and dynamic model are developed respectively from the long-term view and short-term view.Studies have shown that there is unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the static environment and the auction converges to unique Nash equilibrium point in the dynamic environment when the advertisers adopt the best -response strategy , and in the dynamic environment the auctioneer ’ s revenue is higher than that in the static environment .The nu-merical examples show that in the dynamic environment the auction converges to deferent equilibrium point with different initial bidding vectors .The results provide the auctioneer with a basis for decision making for the reve-nue forecast and auction mechanism optimization .