CAJ | 학술논문

在存在强势零售商的非对称竞争渠道中，首先在三种博弈时机下分析协商机制、市场竞争以及强势零售商讨价还价能力对均衡结果的影响，然后探讨竞争渠道的内生时机，最后分别从销售成本和卖场流量两个角度对基本模型进行拓展。研究表明：协商机制提高强势零售渠道的市场需求和利润；当市场竞争较为激烈时，制造商将从零售商竞争中获得＂渔翁之利＂，强势零售商过于挤压产品批发价格将遭受利润损失；以往研究中关于零售商同步领导的博弈时机假设是有缺陷的，序贯领导才是竞争渠道的内生时机，并且销售成本差异和卖场流量差异将缩小内生时机的双均衡区域。
재존재강세령수상적비대칭경쟁거도중，수선재삼충박혁시궤하분석협상궤제、시장경쟁이급강세령수상토개환개능력대균형결과적영향，연후탐토경쟁거도적내생시궤，최후분별종소수성본화매장류량량개각도대기본모형진행탁전。연구표명：협상궤제제고강세령수거도적시장수구화리윤；당시장경쟁교위격렬시，제조상장종령수상경쟁중획득＂어옹지리＂，강세령수상과우제압산품비발개격장조수리윤손실；이왕연구중관우령수상동보령도적박혁시궤가설시유결함적，서관령도재시경쟁거도적내생시궤，병차소수성본차이화매장류량차이장축소내생시궤적쌍균형구역。
In the non-asymmetric competing channels with a dominant retailer , this paper analyzes the effects of negotiation mechanism , market competition and bargaining power of dominant retailer on equilibrium results un-der three game timing , and then explores endogenous timing of competing channels .Finally , the basic model is extended from two angels of sale cost and store traffic .The study shows that the negotiation mechanism improves market demand and profits of dominant retail channel .When the market has more intense competition , the man-ufacturer will get the benefit of the fisherman from retailer competition , and dominant retailer will suffer from strongly depressing product wholesale price .In the past studies , the game timing hypothesis of simultaneous leadership of retailers has some flaws , and the sequential leadership is endogenous timing of competing channels . Differential sale cost and store traffic will narrow the double-equilibrium region of endogenous timing .