CAJ | 학술논문

承诺制度作为欧盟反垄断执法的一个重要工具，主要的优势体现比一般裁决更快地恢复市场竞争以及节约执法成本。而这种便捷的背后也带来一定的局限性，不用实际去发现侵权行为和通过“谈判和解”的方式可能会降低反垄断执法的威慑力，同时也赋予了欧盟委员会广泛的自由裁量权，使得执法产生任意性和范围的模糊性等问题。通过构建自由裁量权的合理性内核，在内容上考虑“比例性原则”以及“损害原则”的影响，使得救济的选择具有合理性和必要性，完善了承诺制度的架构。
승낙제도작위구맹반롱단집법적일개중요공구，주요적우세체현비일반재결경쾌지회복시장경쟁이급절약집법성본。이저충편첩적배후야대래일정적국한성，불용실제거발현침권행위화통과“담판화해”적방식가능회강저반롱단집법적위섭력，동시야부여료구맹위원회엄범적자유재량권，사득집법산생임의성화범위적모호성등문제。통과구건자유재량권적합이성내핵，재내용상고필“비례성원칙”이급“손해원칙”적영향，사득구제적선택구유합이성화필요성，완선료승낙제도적가구。
Commitment as an important tool of the EU antitrust enforcement, the main advantages are considered speedier than formal sanctions (prohibition or infringement decisions) in restoring normal competitive market conditions and with lower enforcement cost.There are several limitations in the commitment decision, not only without actually to discover the antitrust behaviour and by“negotiating” way may reduce the deterrent effect, but also gives the Commission with extensive discretion, which may cause the ambiguity and arbitrariness.In order to construct discretion of commitment, it should consider the effect of “principle of proportionality” and “principle of harm”, and that lead to the remedy with more rationality and necessity, so it could perfect the commitment system.