CAJ | 학술논문

基于集群质量联盟中的每个参与企业在合作初始都愿意根据一个各方都同意的最优共识原则来分配各自的支付，以及集群合作中的支付是可以转移的两个假设前提下，构建了集群质量联盟内多企业间动态合作微分博弈模型，提出了集群合作下的整体理性要求与个体理性要求。研究表明：在集群质量联盟内的多企业动态合作联盟中，当参与合作的每个集群企业都采取根据当前时间及其相应状态下制定的最优策略时，该合作联盟整体的收益值随着时间的推移在不断地发生改变；而集群合作联盟在合作结束时间的收益值等于合作联盟中所有企业在终点所获得的报酬进行相应贴现后的贴现值总和。
기우집군질량련맹중적매개삼여기업재합작초시도원의근거일개각방도동의적최우공식원칙래분배각자적지부，이급집군합작중적지부시가이전이적량개가설전제하，구건료집군질량련맹내다기업간동태합작미분박혁모형，제출료집군합작하적정체이성요구여개체이성요구。연구표명：재집군질량련맹내적다기업동태합작련맹중，당삼여합작적매개집군기업도채취근거당전시간급기상응상태하제정적최우책략시，해합작련맹정체적수익치수착시간적추이재불단지발생개변；이집군합작련맹재합작결속시간적수익치등우합작련맹중소유기업재종점소획득적보수진행상응첩현후적첩현치총화。
Based on two assumptions,that is each enterprise during the cluster cooperative will agree to allocate their payment according to the optimal consensus principle initially,and the payment during the cluster cooperation can be transferred,multiGenterprises dynamic cooperative differential game model in the cluster quality alliance was established in this paper,and the overall rationality and individual rationality of cluster cooperation was put forward,and research shows that in the cluster quality alliance of multi enterprise dynamic cooperation,the whole values of the alliance required will change with time change when each cluster enterprises participating in the cooperation adopt the optimal strategy and the corresponding state of the current time.And the return value of cluster cooperation alliance at the end of cooperation is equal to the sum total of all enterprises obtained reward discounting in the end.