中国工程科学
中國工程科學
중국공정과학
ENGINEERING SCIENCE
2014年
10期
77-83
,共7页
吴孝灵%周晶%王冀宁%彭以忱
吳孝靈%週晶%王冀寧%彭以忱
오효령%주정%왕기저%팽이침
PPP项目%特许收益%单期补偿%激励性%有效性
PPP項目%特許收益%單期補償%激勵性%有效性
PPP항목%특허수익%단기보상%격려성%유효성
PPP project%concession income%single period compensation%incentive%validi-ty
考虑到public private partnership(PPP)项目实际收益的不确定性,首先基于政府需求,通过引入项目运营收益的相对补偿指数,设计一种依赖特许收益的单期补偿契约;然后基于政府无法将私人投资变量纳入该契约,分别从集中决策与分散决策角度建立公私之间博弈模型来研究该契约的最优形式及其激励性与有效性,并给出政府有效补偿对策。研究表明:所得最优补偿契约既能激励私人选择政府集中决策时的最优初始投资,又能激励私人与政府共担风险、共享收益,但有效补偿还应满足项目社会效益约束,即对政府意味着有效补偿应适应项目实际不同情景。
攷慮到public private partnership(PPP)項目實際收益的不確定性,首先基于政府需求,通過引入項目運營收益的相對補償指數,設計一種依賴特許收益的單期補償契約;然後基于政府無法將私人投資變量納入該契約,分彆從集中決策與分散決策角度建立公私之間博弈模型來研究該契約的最優形式及其激勵性與有效性,併給齣政府有效補償對策。研究錶明:所得最優補償契約既能激勵私人選擇政府集中決策時的最優初始投資,又能激勵私人與政府共擔風險、共享收益,但有效補償還應滿足項目社會效益約束,即對政府意味著有效補償應適應項目實際不同情景。
고필도public private partnership(PPP)항목실제수익적불학정성,수선기우정부수구,통과인입항목운영수익적상대보상지수,설계일충의뢰특허수익적단기보상계약;연후기우정부무법장사인투자변량납입해계약,분별종집중결책여분산결책각도건립공사지간박혁모형래연구해계약적최우형식급기격려성여유효성,병급출정부유효보상대책。연구표명:소득최우보상계약기능격려사인선택정부집중결책시적최우초시투자,우능격려사인여정부공담풍험、공향수익,단유효보상환응만족항목사회효익약속,즉대정부의미착유효보상응괄응항목실제불동정경。
In consideration of the uncertainty of public private partnership(PPP)project ben-efit,firstly a relative index to describe the operating compensation for the project is introduced to design a single period compensation contract based on the government’s need. Then based on the fact that the private investment variable can’t be included in the contract,a game model between the public and private sector is proposed to explore the contact’s optimal form,incen-tive effect and valid condition respectively from the centralized and disperse decision-making. The research results show that the obtained optimal contract can encourage the private investor to choose the same optimal investment scale as the government’s centralized decision-making, and share both risks and revenues with the government. However,the valid compensation must satisfy the project’s social welfare constraint,which implies the valid compensation should be adapted to different actual scenes for PPP project.